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Abstract 
In modern usage, “love” and “justice” are terms used to describe universal standards of 
behavior even though the modern materialist worldview cannot account for such universal, 
abstract entities. Spenser’s Faerie Queene dramatizes the conceptual origin of these and similar 
terms in human experience; for, as C.S. Lewis has noted, Spenser’s poetry “Consists in giving an 
imagined body to the immaterial” (AL 322). Posing an answer to the question of whether these 
“imagined bodies” reflect an order of being transcending human experience, the romance 
narrative of Book III argues in the affirmative by demonstrating that universal standards such as 
love and justice become unintelligible when understood as private expressions of desire. For, if 
love and justice are conventional expressions of human desire, the drama of Book III is largely 
concerned with illustrating the ways convention inevitably distorts, restricts, and ultimately 
destroys human nature. Conversely, Spenser’s knight of chastity represents the indomitable 
power of nature unleashed in the service of a higher order of love—a standard for which the 
subjective experience of desire simply cannot account. Beginning with the desiring look in 
Merlin’s mirror, the alienation Britomart experiences in response to her reflection invokes the 
perceptual tension existing between self and other. Spenser’s allusion to Narcissus indicates that 
such subjective dislocation represents a divide insuperable to fallen intellects, yet the legend of 
chastity establishes love’s transcendent basis upon this very paradox, in the conjunction of 
opposites reflecting in their complementarity a figuration of universal, providential, order.  
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Introduction: Through a Glass Darkly 
In his letter to the Corinthian church, the Apostle Paul gives expression to the infirmity of 
mortal perception in the memorable phrase: “Now we see through a glass darkly.”1 Paul’s simple 
and elegant metaphor foregrounds the consequences of Original Sin for human knowledge: 
separation from the truth of God is coterminous with the epistemological and ontological double-
bind to which man is now subject. We labor under a veil dividing the self from the larger reality 
(of God). Like human nature, this veil is a mixed thing—it conceals “Truth” even as it acquaints 
us with truth’s general character and outline. Fittingly, the word the King James Version 
translates as “darkly” is derived from the Greek word ainigmati, “enigma.”2 Indeed, perception is 
an enigma. It is gateway between being and knowing, where we come to the end of ourselves 
and that which is undeniably other—the liminal frontier where language and thought begin to 
fail. Modern scholarship has devoted much of its energies to this tension, producing a rich and 
various nomenclature across the academic disciplines. The gap between “self” and “other,” 
reader and text, subject and object, consciousness and unconsciousness—are iterations of the 
same, essential dilemma. 
What I propose in this paper on Edmund Spenser is neither a commentary on Paul’s letter 
nor a critique of postmodern theory, but an exploration of a specific poem, from a relatively 
unpopular genre of literature (I mean allegory) that presumes to resolve the difficulties presented 
in both. The Faerie Queene accomplishes this, to varying degrees, and in limited ways that I will 
discuss. In short, Spenser’s poem contains a sustained, contextualizing vision of life that is fully 
aware of the paradox of human perception, and even anchored in it. In this sense, Spenser’s work 
                                                 
1 Authorized King James Version, 1 Cor. 13:12. 
2 The KJV was translated from Jerome’s Vulgate translation, aenigmate. 
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represents a valuable counterpoint to modern (and postmodern) insecurities of totalization and 
universality, and therefore deserves a place among contemporary discussions of literature and 
epistemology. 
This paper will examine the ways sexual desire functions throughout The Faerie Queene 
as a heuristic Spenser uses to locate human identity through the expression of perceived needs. 
The chastity legend of Book III in particular asks whether desire of itself provides a reliable 
standard by which to measure. If we accept the hypothesis that the self exists as an aggregate of 
needs (real and perceived), it follows that the truest picture of human nature must be that which 
is most comprehensive: the corporate expression of these in the collective form of convention. 
Spenser’s rejection of this position is clearly demonstrated in the legend of Book III, which is 
largely concerned with the ways convention inevitably distorts, restricts, and ultimately destroys 
human nature. For Spenser, desire reflects, rather than constitutes, the true form of Man. Rather 
than define the individual by his appetites—or by the appetites of others, which regulate 
powerfully in the guise of social convention—Spenser expresses a dynamic notion of perception 
that compasses the social form of Man as well as the individual. He accomplishes this by 
locating the self, paradoxically, as a relation between the flux of desire and the stability of 
reason, codified in the virtues of chastity and justice.   
Spenser’s angle of vision is characteristic of his age, an age obsessed with Man’s place in 
the cosmos (Shire 89), and this Renaissance project is apparent in Spenser’s consistently 
totalizing vision, which seeks to integrate the individual consciousness with a cosmic order. His 
genius appears not in the originality of his theme but rather in the execution. And he is without 
peer in this regard. The Faerie Queen itself is a cosmos, a brilliantly-accorded disposition of 
elements reflecting in every part, the same, unifying telos. Part reflects whole; whole reflects 
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part—identity and difference correspond equally within a grand, harmonizing vision—what 
might be called an ontology of love, established upon the Platonic idea that a thing’s unique form 
is existentially and essentially its metaphysical positioning in relation to other things.3  
My argument is oriented around a central image in Book III, Britomart’s encounter with 
her shadow-lover in “Venus’ looking glas” (i.8.9). The mirror functions as originating cause of 
Spenser’s chastity legend, the paradigmatic quest to authenticate the self in the undeniably 
“other.” The fact that the image is a shadow, that she must go in quest of the actual body, and 
that she herself must undergo a transformation to bring this about—identifies the narrative 
rhythm of the chastity legend as the recurring struggle to surmount the perceptual divide which 
separates every viewing subject from its ideal self. This struggle typifies the cosmic process 
through which the fallen world is redeemed, as Nature states in Book VII: “All things by their 
change their being doe dilate” and thus “Doe worke their owne perfection so by fate” 
(VII.vii.58).   
An illustration of this process, Britomart’s virtual encounter with Artegall symbolizes the 
inward and outward process of becoming within the mutable world. Love, specifically sexual 
love, furnishes the dramatic location in Faerie Queene where the conflict between self and other 
might be resolved4: it is here that Spenser’s knight of chastity liberates romantic desire from the 
destructive, subjective experience immortalized in the figure of Narcissus. Appropriating 
archetypal imagery from Old Testament scripture and Neoplatonist philosophy, Spenser presents 
a definition of love that emerges unites line and circle, Logos and Eros in a single complex 
                                                 
3 In contradistinction to Aristotelian “immanence”—which is the idea that unique individuals are what they are by 
nature, the notion of some abstract (or even, in a sense, autonomous) individuality. For Spenser—and many 
Renaissance intellectuals influenced by Neoplatonism—conceptions of being in terms of individual substance fail to 
account for the irreducible, ontological relations that bind immanent, finite beings to each other and to their 
transcendent, infinite source in God. 
4 As well as the conflict between desire and reason, chastity and justice—the “vertical” level of Spenser’s allegory. 
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statement, a marriage of two opposing metaphors representing the way the mind imposes forms 
upon reality. 
The poet explains that the magic mirror was created by Merlin as a gift for Britomart’s 
father, King Ryence, “That neuer foes his kingdome might inuade” (ii.21). Ironically, as the 
knight of chastity, the mirror provides the means by which Britomart’s “kingdom” is invaded by 
the knight of justice. Though it is important to note that the mirror does not project a vision so 
much as it unveils the vision of the viewer. The poet explains: 
It vertue had, to shew in perfect sight,  
What euer thing was in the world contaynd,  
Betwixt the lowest earth and heauens hight,  
So that it to the looker appertaynd. (III.ii.19) 
Showing perfectly any object as it “pertains” to the viewer, the mirror exposes the self’s true 
relation to the objects of the world. But when Britomart first looks into the magic mirror, she 
ignores the “virtue” of the mirror, preferring to look with vanity, the sense implied in the 
following: 
Her selfe a while therein she vewd in vaine;  
Tho her auizing of the vertues rare,  
Which thereof spoken were, she gan againe  
Her to bethinke of, that mote to her selfe pertaine. (III.ii.22)  
When Britomart begins to reflect (“Her to bethink of”), her perception changes from that of 
unconscious, instinctual pleasure to a one conscious and cognitively ordered. The reflection is 
transformed from the familiar image of desire to a spiritual vision. The reflection is still her 
self—but the person she sees is not her. The second image is elusive; it has been altered by 
cognition. At once foreign and unreal, Artegall appears in the form of the masculine ideal such as 
it appears only in poetry: 
11 
 
Eftsoones there was presented to her eye 
A comely knight, all arm’d in complete wize, 
Through whose bright ventayle lifted vp on hye 
His manly face, that did his foes agrize, 
And friends to termes of gentle truce entize, 
Lookt foorth, as Phoebus face out of the east, 
Betwixt two shadie mountaines doth arize; 
Portly his person was, and much increast 
Through his Heroicke grace, and honorable gest. (III.ii.24-25) 
The image arouses inextinguishable passion, driving her out of her father’s house and into the 
world. She is transformed by her quest of an imagined lover into the knight of chastity. Spenser 
links the mirror episode with the myth of Narcissus, raising suspicions as to the legitimacy of 
Britomart’s perception and the desire it arouses (exacerbated by the fact that the marriage does 
not take place within the poem). In conceptual language, Britomart’s reflection and the 
subsequent vision creates an antithesis between two modes of perception: the literal and the 
figural, bodily sensation and cognitive extrapolation. The episode suggests that the attainment of 
ultimate satisfaction—synonymous with the discovery of the true self—requires the soul to leave 
behind the tactile pleasure of its sensuous relation to beauty for the pursuit of beauty’s 
transcendent meaning.5  
In the Old Testament, the Mosaic Law represented a similar challenge to the nation of 
Israel. It was a literal code masking a spiritual reality. The law represented the “works of the 
flesh,” a veil signifying the complete separation between God and man. It was never intended to 
provide the means to holiness, because its purpose was not to offer salvation but to reveal sin— 
and through dim figures, shadows, and signs point to the coming Messiah. According to Paul’s 
letter to the Corinthians, those who seek salvation by means of the law find themselves trapped 
                                                 
5 Richard of St. Victor wrote: “[the mirror] shows us an image of eternal beauty in the beauty of a momentary body. 
But that image is fleeting, it has no substance; and we must learn how to leave the mirror behind and to love a being 
that is invisible and immutable” (De Trinitate, V.vi). 
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within the veil of the law, but those who look to Christ are liberated. Seeing through the veil, they 
experience transformative vision:  
Even unto this day, when Moses is read, the veil is upon their heart. Nevertheless 
when it shall turn to the Lord, the veil shall be taken away. Now the Lord is that 
Spirit: and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. But we all, with open 
face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are being transformed into the 
same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord.  
(2 Corinthians 3:16-18, my emphasis) 
Because the law functioned as a mirror reflecting the people’s sinfulness, it served as a veil 
protecting them from the holiness of God—for the sinner cannot look upon the holiness of the 
Lord (Psalm 24:3-4), nor the Lord look upon the sinner (Habakkuk 1:3).6 But, mirabile dictu, the 
writer says that when one turns to the Lord, the veil is removed. Equipped with new vision, the 
self experiences its reflection as the image of God. An apt analogy for the present thesis, 
Spenser’s cautionary example of Narcissus corresponds to the blindness of the Pharisee—for, in 
seeking wholeness in a mirror reflecting his own, broken image, Narcissus is blinded to the 
vision of wholeness lying beyond. Britomart, in contrast, typifies the obedient soul who turns 
from that image to the contemplation of the thing itself, finding there the self in its perfection and 
glory.  
The vision in Merlin’s mirror foregrounds the nonliteral dimensions of the Faerie 
Queene, evoking the conventional mirror metaphor of Elizabethan literature and the love 
allegory of courtly lyric. Inner and outer are held in balance as the reader must determine to what 
extent the vision is the reflection of Britomart’s psychic interior or the phenomenal description of 
her future husband produced through Merlin’s art. The subsequent action reveals that the 
                                                 
6 “Who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord? or who shall stand in his holy place? He that hath clean hands, and a 
pure heart” (Psalm 24:3-4); “Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and canst not look on iniquity” (Habakkuk 
1:13a). 
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opposition is only virtual; the sundering of Britomart and her idealized reflection in the mirror is 
merely an accident of time, as Merlin will declare: “The spouse of Britomart, is Arthegall” 
(III.iii.26). However, in the course of Britomart’s efforts to “guyde the heauenly causes to their 
constant terme” (st. 25), a curious reversal takes place. The form of her inner desire becomes 
reflected in her own person, as she herself becomes transformed into the image of a chivalric 
knight. Taken together, the revelation of Merlin’s mirror and its meaning, as it unfolds in the 
course of the narrative, serve to illustrate Spenser’s belief that the division between the inner 
world and the outer is a conflict mediated and resolved through perception. 
At stake is the harmonization of the self and society. Spenser inverts the courtly trope of 
the questing knight by reversing the traditional gender roles—as if to suggest that the 
conventional portrayal was somehow backward. Set against the traditional narrative, Spenser’s 
romance exposed the false dichotomy at the heart of fin amor; for by promoting ascetic 
renunciation at the same time that it provided occasion for a socially-acceptable form of adultery, 
courtly love had created a bifurcation in the faculty of desire by inserting a division between 
purity and passion. The courtly misconception became insinuated in the social consciousness, its 
effects still felt in Spenser’s day.7 In contrast to the traditional portrayal, in which the lady is 
idealized: pure, austere, and coldly abstract, Spenser’s narrative depicts her as the passionate 
lover and the knight as the idealized image of perfection. In Spenser’s legend, the sexual nature 
is affirmed as well as spiritual, combined in a heightened vision of monogamous marriage.  
                                                 
7 Admittedly, my hasty summary commits the fallacy of overgeneralization, a regrettable necessity as a more in-
depth discussion falls quite outside the scope of this paper. However, whether one agrees with the conventional view 
promoted by Gaston Paris at the turn of the century or with later critics who insist that De Arte Honeste Amandi and 
similar works be taken as nothing short of satire—in other words, the social reality aside—the point I am arguing is 
that Spenser incorporated the contradictory system of courtly love as it existed in literary form. In other words, my 
paper will assume that Spenser is responding to the literary tradition he received, not to the poet’s personal 
reservations. Sources: Lewis, AL pgs. 13,18,36,41,60; Ferrante and Economou, Introduction; Economou, pgs. 17-23; 
Goldin, Perspectives pgs. 51-3. 
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The process of restoration begins with the desire aroused through recognition of one’s 
image as in a mirror. As Maurice Evans has said, Book III is the book of sex (152). Sexual 
attraction is the locus where flesh and spirit collide, a place of sacred knowledge where, as 
Xenophon put it, a man in love becomes “one transformed, the cynosure of all initiated in the 
mysteries of this divinity” (Symposium 1.10).8 A harmonizing force, sexual desire represents the 
mingling of conflict and union, mortality and procreation, the eternal and the temporal, love and 
war—the multiple senses of which are evoked by the virtual dislocation evident in Britomart’s 
reflection.9 Sexual knowledge establishes the nexus between flesh and spirit in Faerie Queene, a 
correlation Benjamin Lockerd has noted between Spenser’s poem and Apuleius’s myth of Cupid 
and Psyche. Lockerd argues that the legend of Psyche “Introduces the notion that the soul 
(Beauty, Psyche) transforms and assimilates the dark, destructive part of human nature by 
marrying it, by accepting the fact that spirit and flesh are indissolubly joined” (115). 
Accordingly, Britomart’s transformation from maiden to knight expresses a corresponding 
illustration of human nature responding to beauty’s higher form—which the example of 
Narcissus mirrors as demonic parody by illustrating the inverse tendency of the dark and 
destructive forces of human nature to assimilate and transform the image of beauty into its own 
likeness. 
The reference to “Cephisus foolish child” (III.ii.44) evokes the contrasting danger of such 
encounters for those without self-knowledge. Ovid’s tale portrays the flattering illusion that is 
produced when the viewer’s perspective is confined to the form of its own desire. Like the 
Pharisee who thought to make himself holy through his observance of the law, Narcissus 
                                                 
8 C.f. also Plato, Phaedrus 245a. 
9 For Kathleen Williams, these antitheses contribute an essential pattern to Spenser’s design for The Faerie Queene 
(Glass 3).  
15 
 
foolishly thought he could achieve self-actualization through love of self—to such a mind, all the 
world is self. Narcissus represents a verminous selfhood that is immune to the transcendence of 
love—which requires the recognition of, and submission to, the desires of another—and the 
narcissist simply cannot do. A central presupposition of my thesis is the notion that “desire” is a 
volition incapable of self-denial or seeing “beyond” itself. Desire is by definition restricted to the 
centripetal orbit, a self-defining form. My desire cannot be your desire: they may appear similar, 
or compatible, but the necessarily private and subjective nature of desire as an expression of an 
individual ego renders each categorically distinct. This, in fine, describes the self-generated veil 
dividing the self from God, or Intellect (vertical axis) and from society (horizontal axis). 
Patrick Cheney rightly asserts that “Chastity derives from understanding the unity of 
human desire and divine will, earth and heaven” (3). Britomart’s quest parallels a corresponding 
struggle in the imagination to uncover the sacred center lying beneath the deceptive surface of 
appearances. Encompassing heart, mind, and soul, her desire corresponds to the three 
Neoplatonic movements of mind found in Bonaventure’s Itinerarium Mentis: conversion intra 
nos (inward), extra nos (outward), and supra nos (above). In this view, the aim of Britomart’s 
quest is no less than the recovery of Eden, which should not be understood as a location in space, 
but the recovery of an ontological relation. Such a recovery necessarily requires the anterior 
recovery of man’s unfallen perception, vision synonymous with biblical apokalupsis. Contrary to 
the popular understanding, the actual meaning of “apocalypse” has nothing to do with 
Armageddon and the end of the world; in Greek it means, literally, “unveiling.” Appropriately, 
the actual Greek title of the Book of Revelation is “The Unveiling of Jesus Christ,” for it 
describes Christ revealed in the end of times first to his bride, then to the world.  
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Significant to my argument is the manner in which this occurs. As the archetypal groom, 
Christ reveals himself to his bride by lifting her veil. Accordingly, Christ’s work throughout 
history has been the removal of the veil of blindness over the Lord’s people, revealing the God 
who is already there.10 In biblical imagery, then, “unveiling” does not describe a change in 
reality but a change in one’s perception of reality. The point is illustrative, for Britomart’s quest 
is also a perceptual unveiling. Like the “seed” of the Gospel message (in Luke 8:11), containing 
an inner meaning that can only be reached by penetrating the outer shell, Spenser’s mirror 
similarly penetrates the heroine’s imaginative soil; it becomes her “engraft paine” (III.ii.17) a 
metaphor suggestive of conception.11 The vision is a type of parthenogenesis by which she has 
been implanted with an allegorical seed, which speaks to the fecundity of allegorical vision.  
 My argument is divided into two parts. The first section deals primarily with the 
theoretical basis of the perceptual conflict of Book III, and the second with applying those 
concepts to the poem itself.  My first chapter, “The Obscuring Veil,” introduces the problem of 
desire, which Spenser viewed as a faculty confused in human consciousness between the 
conflicting instincts of purity and passion. The following chapter, “The Reflecting Mirror,” 
examines the ways Spenser intended his Faerie Queene to function as a mirror for his society. 
As an exemplary model, Spenser’s poem exposes the ways Elizabethan perceptions had become 
corrupted through flattering conventions that reflected a distorted view of desire, and of human 
nature. Beginning with a brief look at the Renaissance mirror metaphor and how the concept 
informs Spenserian perception, I examine two expressions of it, in two contradictory forms of 
perception in Faerie Queene. The first, named after Narcissus, is a perception of 
unconsciousness, subsisting entirely in subjective experience. Existing in itself and enjoyed for 
                                                 
10 The title of a book by Francis Schaeffer, The God Who Is There (InterVarsity Press, 1998. Print.) 
11 implies the implanting of virtues, dispositions, sentiments in the mind (OED 2.a). 
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itself, desire does not “get” anywhere, philosophically speaking; therefore, this is the reflection 
one gets by simply looking “into” the mirror of desire. The second, which I have called the 
Mirror of Christ, describes a spiritually-guided perception achieved by looking “through” 
subjective desire to the vision of sacred reality. This is generative perception, for it “reproduces” 
the spiritual reality within the viewer, transforming the subjective desires into the image of the 
higher, spiritual pattern. 
 The second section of my argument begins in Chapter Three, “The Soul’s Journey,” and 
consists in my exposition of Spenserian perception in the Faerie Queene. My analysis is divided 
into three sections, corresponding to Bonaventure’s three mirrors—self, world, and God. To each 
of these I have appended an additional term describing the soul’s response to each encounter 
using a pattern modelled after Pico’s triadic theory of emanation.12 Beginning with the 
awakening of desire, the journey into the world of the self describes the soul’s movement out of 
the unconscious toward the widening (re)formation of individual consciousness. The journey into 
the world describes the process in which the soul is tested through its encounter with false 
appearances. The final movement “into God” describes the restoration of the soul’s natural 
relations—self-knowledge on the cosmic scale, accomplishing the inclusive harmonization of 
eros and logos within society, which is to establish God’s kingdom on earth.  
                                                 
12 My cycle is a modification of Pico’s system, which he divided according to the following headings: overflowing 
(emanantio), conversion (conversio), and return (remeatio). See Wind, 43. 
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Chapter One: The Obscuring Veil 
The place to begin an analysis of Spenser’s contradictory appearances is at the Temple of 
Venus, where the poet describes the figure of Concord. A principle moderating the oppositional 
powers of her children, Hate and Love, Concord is the universal form at work in all expressions 
of concord in human life. She is the source of “blessed Peace,” “Friendship trew,” and “strength, 
wealth, and happiness” (IV.x.34). She is also the spiritual principle of concord holding the 
universe together with “inviolable bands” (x.35). Operative in human as well as atomic relations, 
her rule extends to the realms of matter and spirit. She appears in Spenser’s “Hymn of Love” as 
the god of love who creates the universe out of chaos, first by imposing distinction upon material 
forms and then harmony:  
The world that was not till he did it make; 
Whose sundrie parts he fro them selues did seuer, 
The which before had lyen confused euer, 
…………………………………………………. 
He then them tooke, and tempering goodly well 
Their contrary dislikes with loued meanes. (lines 78-89) 
The complex function described here exceeds the traditional personification of love as the 
cosmic “uniting instinct”; it is Concord, rather: the mediating power incorporating the distinct 
powers of her offspring. Like Hate, she divides the elements: “Whose sundrie parts he fro them 
selues did seuer” (line 80); as Love, she tempers “Their contrary dislikes with loued means” (line 
89). Encompassing union and division, she is a principle of desire and also of order, as we see 
again in The Faerie Queene under the auspices of Love: 
Well did Antiquitie a God thee deeme,  
That ouer mortall minds hast so great might,  
To order them, as best to thee doth seeme, 
And all their actions to direct aright;  
The fatall purpose of diuine foresight. (III.iii.2, my emphasis) 
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Directing “mortal minds” to fulfill heavenly providence, her office includes the unexpected 
implication that, as Love, she directs “all actions.” What we thought was the corrupted force of 
human passion is actually the instrument of heavenly purpose.  
Spenser presents this idea more explicitly in canto five, where he describes Love’s effects 
in human conduct: “In braue sprite it kindles goodly fire,” culminating in “all high desert and 
honour.” Among the “baser wit” on the other hand, “it leads to “sensuall desire” and “lewd 
slouth” (III.v.1).   It is a strange fact of human psychology that a beautiful image can terminate in 
such diametrically opposed conclusions, a paradox illustrated in the medieval conception of the 
two Venuses. The distinction began in response to what George Economou has identified as a 
difference between heavenly love (caritas) and earthly (amor). 
It is, in a word, a representation of the paradox of human existence since the fall: 
a single instinct or impulse, which before the Fall enjoyed both moral and 
psychological integrity, may lead to opposite and mutually exclusive ends because 
it has become fragmented and confused in human consciousness. (Economou 20) 
In De Planctu Naturae Alan de Lille represents the conflicting, human response toward beauty 
as two dispositions of the same goddess, Venus caelestis and Venus scelestis. The first has to do 
with the propagation of spiritual forms, the second with the propagation of physical bodies. Pico 
della Mirandola broke with earlier philosophers, including his mentor Marsilio Ficino, in 
identifying three powers arising from the image of beauty: 
. . . in our Soul, (naturally indifferent to sensible or intelligible Beauty,) there may 
be three Loves; one in the Intellect, Angelical; the second Humane; the third 
Sensual. The two latter are conversant about the same object, Corporeal Beauty; 
the sensual fixeth its Intention wholly in it; the humane separates it from Matter. 
(Commento 3.4, my emphasis)13 
                                                 
13 For more discussion of the ambiguities of the names of these Venuses see Wind, pp. 1, 3, 8-9, and Panofsky, pp. 
I44-5, note 5I. 
20 
 
Returning again to our heroine, Britomart, the poet declares her to be the agent of Love’s power 
in whom “none doe triumph more” and the executor of “The fatal purpose of divine foresight” 
(III.iii.3). Pico’s scheme describes her well: she unites the powers of the celestial and the sensual 
into a third power (Pico’s “Humane”), the composite reflection of all three. She is not an 
inviolable virgin nor a slave to lecherous passion, but a virgin aspiring to passionate and pure, 
monogamous marriage. She embodies infinite passion united to infinite purity, particularized in 
human form.  
Thomas Roche has correctly identified in the Spenserian discordia “the emergence of 
order from chaos and of friendship from enmity” (Kindly Flame 17); however, as is often the 
case when dealing with Spenser, precise formulae rarely hold true in all points. As we have seen 
in the operations of the god of Love in the “Hymn of Heavenly Love” and the figure of Concord 
in Faerie Queene, Spenser does not simply mute the antitheses of union and distinction by 
erasing their differences in a higher synthesis. Concord’s role is not to diminish either of her 
children, but to bring her conflicting powers into that generative balance by which individuals in 
the sensible world “Doe worke their owne perfection so by fate.” Lockerd suggests that Spenser 
saw in the instinctual drives of sex and aggression an indication not of schizophrenic polarity, 
but of a universal principle at work in organic matter. He cites a distinction between eros and 
logos made by Jung: “Eros is interweaving; Logos is differentiating knowledge, clarifying light. 
Eros is relatedness, Logos is discrimination and detachment” (C.W., 13:41, qtd. in Lockerd 62), 
Lockerd argues that, for Spenser, these drives are simply physical manifestations of much larger, 
cosmic, forces recognized by modern psychology as constituent factors of consciousness. 
Spenser’s use of this antithesis in The Faerie Queene may have been inspired by the 
Platonic theology of Pico della Mirandola, who ascribed a similar, dual activity to the 
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intermediary Neoplatonic realm of Mind (or Intellect).14 In the Phaedrus Plato describes the 
origin of Love as the offspring of Lack (penia) and Plenty (porus). In Pico’s system, these 
substantive personifications become dynamic powers denominated by the Aristotelian terms 
“act” and “potency.” Their functions correspond to Jung’s Eros and Logos, respectively. Pico 
defined Mind’s “act” as the upward-regarding, loving contemplation of the Father’s perfection, 
and “potency” as the downward, regulating power through which it shapes the lower substance 
of World-Soul into the image of the Father (Commento I.9.472-3)15; “potency” is equated with 
the unlimited quality of matter as famously stated by Plato in the Philebus (23Cff) and “act” with 
limit and form.16  
Combining Pico’s concept with the Jungian gives us a thick description of the two forces 
and their many guises: desire (Eros) is the upward movement seeking union with upper forms; 
law (Logos) is the regulatory power that transforms the unlimited substance of matter—as much 
as possible—into accord with the infinite formal perfection of the Ideas.17 Eros drives us to seek 
the creator; Logos, regulating, does not allow us to approach as we currently are (as fallen 
creatures). Eros is associated with matter, the many (Pico’s “unlimited”) and the feminine; Logos 
with form, the one, and the masculine. “Act” (desire) is matter’s response to form; “potency” 
(regulation) is form’s response to matter.18 The latter is destructive, the former, generative. 
                                                 
14 Michael Allen writes, “In regard to this being, Angel or Mind is compounded of two contrary principles, like 
every other created thing existing between the two uncompounded extremes of God and prime matter” (96). 
15 Valery Reese discusses a similar conception in Ficino’s De Amore IV.iv, where Ficino discusses how the soul 
through contemplation may rise to the heavenly realms, or, forsaking “divine light” may descend completely into 
matter (85). In the commentary on the Phaedrus Ficino says Venus is the active power drawn to beauty through two 
kinds of intellect: the contemplative, which he names the Saturnian, and the active, or imitative, that is, the Jovian 
(see Michael Allen “The Birth Day of Venus” pg. 96).  
16 Also in the Timaeus, where Plato identifies matter as “receptacle and in a manner nurse of all becoming” (49a); 
C.f. Aristotle in Physics I.ix.192a. 
17 The interpretation of Pico’s Commento is largely derived from Allen pp. 88-92. 
18Sear Jayne writes that “Love in man is not only a God-given and cosmically necessary and irresistible search 
upwards toward a perfection which is both spiritual and intellectual; it is also an irresistible, God-given, and 
cosmically necessary compulsion downward to create the likeness of Divine Beauty in the physical world” (226). 
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Relating these competing drives to the figure of Concord, it becomes clear that we have been 
describing the powers attributed to her rival sons, Love and Hate. As noted earlier, Spenser’s 
ambiguous terminology obscures the fact that Concord, not her son, embodies the harmonizing 
power of Love; for it is she who reconciles the warring Eros and Logos. 
Once again, Spenser presents the critic with a double challenge. In his essay “Spenser’s 
Garden of Adonis and Britomart’s Quest,” Humphrey Tonkin argues that Spenser’s imagery 
equates Adonis with matter and Venus with form. While Tonkin’s interpretation seems correct 
within the context he uses, one should recall that the garden itself is essentially a feminine space 
(as Kane notes, pg. 126). The garden’s association with fecundity carries an implicit association 
with Plato’s definition of formless matter as “receptacle and in a manner nurse of all becoming” 
(Timaeus 49a). Spenser’s garden echoes Plato’s concept; it is a generative space, much like a 
womb, surrounding and containing Venus and her lover. Spenser’s description of the garden as 
“the first seminarie / Of all things” (III.vi.30) is equally ambiguous, since “seminary” may be 
taken to mean either, primarily, a “seed plot” (OED “seminary” 1), or “place of education” (OED 
“seminary” 4). The feminine character of the first becomes immediately challenged by the 
second, which suggests the masculine implication of form upon matter. Clearly, reducing matter 
and form in the Garden of Adonis to either male or female is inexorably problematic. For 
Spenser, these terms are interpenetrating.  
As indistinguishable as these two principles appear in their perfect unity in the Garden of 
Adonis, the mutable world tends to distill them into diametrically-opposed powers. The 
antithesis invades the sensible world as light enters a prism: its form dictated by the nature of the 
receiving medium. In human emotion this conflict presents itself in the form of love and hate, in 
society as harmony and discord, in the political state as submission and rule (C.f. Kane 109,119). 
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As nature groans under the burden of these warring opposites, Britomart’s indomitable control 
throughout Books III and IV indicates her transcendence of this conflict. As the human 
representative of Spenser’s Concord, she embodies the harmonization of both the masculine and 
the feminine. As C.S. Lewis has said, Britomart is married love (AL 340, my emphasis). As a 
woman, Britomart lacks the masculine drive to possess or control; as knight she is without the 
feminine vulnerability to coercion. Androgyny renders her superior to the powers of either sex 
(Williams, Glass 92, 131).  
Returning to Britomart and her vision, we should remember that her physical 
transformation is the effect of a virtual experience. This is a crucial point, for this is where the 
eruption of the ideal into the real begins. The vision teleologically invests Britomart with the 
power of the completed pair. The comingling of Britomart and the strange knight in the mirror 
presents an image reverberating with mythic and archetypal suggestion. In this image Spenser 
seems to imply that the discordia concors in The Faerie Queene is not absolute, but a matter 
resolved through a spiritually-guided form of perception. Spenser dramatizes the restorative 
process (not the achievement) in which human perception is returned to its unfallen Nature—that 
“nature” being its unimpeded growth from within to perfection, neither checked by accident nor 
sophisticated by art (AL 330). 
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Chapter Two: The Reflecting Mirror 
Merlin’s mirror functions as a metaphor of an allegorical mode of vision transcending the 
antitheses of sensible experience. Like Suzanne Akbari’s definition of “vertical” allegory, it 
“points toward a hidden meaning” the observer must construct within his own mind, “a 
transcendent truth that cannot be conveyed through literal language” (Akbari 14). It is a magic 
mirror, for it entails subordinating the discursive reason to inner vision. Like the examples of 
Tiresias and St. Paul, one must become blind in order to see: a metaphor which might be applied 
to the art of The Faerie Queene as a whole, its deeper sense concealed beneath “coloured shows” 
(Letter to Raleigh). This chapter will attempt to demonstrate how Spenser uses Merlin’s mirror 
to polarize sense perception and spiritual vision at the same time that it illustrates their 
conjunction.  
Spenser’s use of the mirror remains largely conventional. Personal mirrors had become 
available to an unprecedented degree during the sixteenth century, which saw a corresponding 
increase in mirror titles in English literature, illustrated in such popular works as the Mirror for 
Magistrates and George Gascoigne’s The Glass of Government. Venetian innovation had 
produced a new kind of mirror made of crystal glass that was a marked improvement over the 
steel mirror, which, despite the frequent polishing required to prevent oxidation, never offered 
more than a cloudy or often distorted reflection. Interestingly, the new mirrors were the cause of 
a cultural backlash, observable in titles such as Gascoigne’s 1576 The Steele Glas, a satirical 
poem that orchestrated its censure around the crystal glass mirror (Kalas 519). Gascoigne’s poem 
is representative of the increasing anxiety among the cultural elite, many of whom feared the 
moral repercussions of the new mirrors in the belief that its ease of use and undistorted view 
made it a device particularly suited to the sin of vanity. Indeed, it is not difficult to image how 
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the new mirror might have presented the material cause of a paradigmatic shift in the cultural 
imagination: the mirror, which for centuries had served as a reminder that only God sees the 
individual as he truly is—and functioned also as a metaphor for the perfection of God’s 
creation—had become the possession of nearly every bourgeois in England. Among the ladies it 
had become a vain accessory, worn on a silken ribbon tied about the waist (Kalas 521).  
By defining his text as a steel glass, Gascoigne and other reactionaries aligned their 
works with the older interpretive tradition. In contradistinction to the worldly vanity of the 
crystal mirror, these works hid their shadowy meaning from common view (Kalas 524). The vain 
observer did not want the uncomfortable encounter with alterity; he wanted affirmation. 
Gascoigne’s anxiety appears in Spenser’s proem to Book VI, where the poet describes the 
deleterious effects of courtly flattery as a “glasse so gay that it can blynd / The wisest sight” (VI 
Pr.v). Linking false courtesy to the flattering mirror, both signify by means of the deluding self-
image.  
Art, another mirror, also possesses the ability either to deceive or lead to truth, as 
Gascoigne and Spenser aimed to do in their works. Like the deceptiveness of the crystal mirror, 
Spenser denies that “liuing art” or “life-resembling pencil” can accurately figure the true 
character of chastity embodied in Queen Elizabeth (III.Pr.ii). Consequently, Lockerd argues that 
Spenser is here consciously subverting the realistic, flattering mirror, by asserting that poetry 
should not attempt to “picture the world in a straight-forward, realistic way at all”: 
[Spenser’s] brand of poetry is frankly unrealistic and artificial—”colourd 
showes”—and claims only to “shadow” its subject rather than displaying it clearly 
and fully…For the allegorist, shadowing a character may be the best way to 
present the inner, ideal virtues that informs the particular manifestation. (65) 
Lockerd notes an ironic undertone in Spenser’s comments on realistic poetry, where the poet 
rapturously claims that while reading Raleigh, his “senses lulled are in somber delight” 
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(III.Pr.iv)—hardly a positive comment from the sober-minded Spenser. For it was in becoming 
thus rooted in the superficiality of sense experience that Spenser believed “art falls asleep to the 
spiritual world of ideal forms” (Lockerd 65).  
 Spenser’s distrust of appearances suggests a precocious leap beyond modern subjectivity 
in questioning the stability of the homogeneous self. As Lewis has pointed out, character, or the 
“unified personality,” held little interest for the poet of allegory—his interest was in the warring 
elements within the human soul that character might be said to produce, those “accidents 
occurring in a substance” (AL 61). Spenser’s representation invited even the most virtuous lady 
to look beneath the mask she wore to the world. To Elizabeth, he offers in particular two 
visionary mirrors in which to see herself: 
Ne let his fairest Cynthia refuse,  
In mirrours more then one her selfe to see,  
But either Gloriana let her chuse,  
Or in Belphoebe fashioned to bee:  
In th’one her rule, in th’other her rare chastitee. (III.Pr.v) 
The poet’s injunction offers a clue to Spenser’s intent. Gloriana and Belphoebe are rarified 
beings with little presence or bearing upon the poem’s action. The reason being that each lady 
represents an incarnation of otherworldly perfection; Gloriana embodies the “rule” of Logos and 
Belphoebe the “chastitee” of Eros. Neither is intended as a realistic example to be imitated, 
because each reflects her virtue in superlative degree. In degree, therefore—not in kind—
Belphoebe ande Gloriana reflect perfection that is frankly unrealistic to human experience. 
Elizabeth cannot be expected to see herself in either, at least, not perfectly—as in a crystal 
mirror. There is, however, an intermediary mirror in which she might see herself. Spenser’s 
ideals “come to earth” as it were, in the character of Britomart. Exemplifying the virtues of 
“rule” and “chastitee,” Britomart is a reflection of both faery exemplars, but to a realistic 
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degree—an intra-textual mirror of both virtues and also as a didactic mirror for Elizabeth’s 
consideration. Rhetorically, the comparison between Elizabeth and the faery ideals serves a dual 
purpose, ostensibly praising the queen even as it presents an implicit challenge for her to make 
an honest assessment of her shortcomings. The latter effect is compounded by added comparison 
to the fabled Britomart—herself a diminished, intermediary reflection of the “higher”—with 
whom none in Spenser’s audience, not even the Queen, could honestly compare.  
Like Virgil before him, Spenser believed that realistic art is the lie. Following Virgil’s 
example, Spenser sends his shades into the world through the gate of false dreams. The passage 
in Virgil’s Aeneid reads:  
There are two gates of Sleep: the one is said 
To be of horn, through it an easy exit 
Is given to true shades; the other is 
Made of polished ivory, perfect, glittering, 
But through that way the Spirits send false 
Dreams into the world above. And here Anchises, 
When he is done with words, accompanies 
The Sibyl and his son together; and 
He sends them through the gate of ivory. 
(VI.893-98) 
The gate of horn admits truth and ivory, falsehood—a poetic fact infinitely complicated by 
Virgil’s decision to send his hero through the latter. Spenser’s agreement with Virgil might be 
seen in the proem to Book V, where he laments that men have forgotten how to distinguish 
between truth and falsehood: “For that which all men then did vertue call, Is now cald vice” 
(V.Pr.iii). Truth has been replaced, the poet writes, by “the wicked seede of vice…which shortly 
grew full great” (V.i.1). Therefore in Book I Archimago sends false spirits to Redcrosse bearing 
“true-seeming lyes” (I.i.38), an inverse, intra-textual mirror of Spenser’s work itself—a work 
garmented in “coloured showes” and bearing false-seeming truths. Similarly, the travesty of 
“false” Florimell, another true-seeming lie—which Nature “grudg’d to see the counterfeit should 
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shame the thing it selfe” (III.viii.5)—bears a semblance to truth that may dupe the fools 
Braggadoccio and Blandamour, but not the discerning eye of Britomart. For she, like Spenser’s 
reader, has gazed into Merlin’s mirror and learned to read the difference.  
The paradigmatic example of the false, “true-seeming” mirror in Faerie Queene appears 
in the Bower of Bliss. Here, beauty creates a rupture in the reader’s imagination between the 
bower’s attractive appearance and the vicious appetite it signifies. Foregrounding the difference 
between the lifelike mirror and the allegorical, Spenser teaches his audience to read beyond the 
letter by forcing his readers to differentiate between real beauty and the meretricious forms 
encountered, a distinction clearly emphasized in Spenser’s description— 
goodly beautifide  
With all the ornaments of Floraes pride,  
Wherewith her mother Art, as halfe in scorne  
Of niggard Nature, like a pompous bride 
Did decke her, and too lauishly adorne. (II.xii.50) 
This is an attractive, but unnatural, and clearly evil place. Here art is not a supplement to nature, 
but a perversion. It is with little surprise that when we finally encounter Acrasia, she is 
represented not as a mirror of generation, but the inverse: a witch keeping her lover in a humid 
state of docile half-sleep, sucking his spirit, “Quite molten into lust and pleasure lewd” 
(II.xii.73). Those who fall into her net are of two kinds: the willfully base (Gryll), or the merely 
ignorant, who are unable to detect the lie hidden beneath the glitter: 
Over all of purest gold was spred 
A trayle of yuie in his natiue hew:  
For the rich mettall was so coloured, 
That wight, who did not well auis’d it vew,  
Would surely deeme it to be yuie trew. (II.xii.61, my emphasis) 
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Foregrounding the insidious boundary between art and nature, the complex image emphasizes 
the thematic message of the inability to distinguish between false pleasure and the “true” it 
mocks through parody. For Spenser, knowledge of the one is necessary to discern the other. 
The prominence of the Renaissance mirror title arose not from a mistaken belief that the 
mirror could generate knowledge of reality, but that it had the ability to reflect an aspect of 
reality not directly accessible to the observer. It was the observer’s task to gain knowledge by 
interpreting the reflected image correctly (Grabes 112).19 A mirror text was deemed credible only 
if it could be said to mirror the divine idea, while actual mirrors were creditable if they enabled 
viewers to “read” their own images correctly. This was true of actual mirrors as well as the 
metaphorical mirror, as Rayna Kalas has argued in her essay on Renaissance mirror technology 
(523). The appearance of a mirror or “glass” in a Book title signaled that “the text was both a 
reflection of divine ideation and a practical instrument through which that ideal might be 
emulated” (Kalas 522). Such contemplation required active involvement on the part of the 
reader, as Lauren Silberman states in her book, Transforming Desire, “[the mirror tradition] 
provided both a focus on the ethical dimension of reading and a concern for the place of reading 
in the reader’s self-fashioning” (25).  
The metaphor of text-as-mirror had a long history on the continent. In her book on the 
medieval art of memory, Mary Carruthers observes that medieval commentaries on devotion 
often depict the mirror as an object for meditation and private reflection. She cites Gregory the 
Great, who, paraphrasing Augustine, writes: “holy scripture presents a kind of mirror to the eyes 
of the mind, that our inner face may be seen in it” (qtd. in Carruthers 168-9).  Similarly, late 
                                                 
19 Helena Shire describes a similarity in Renaissance views of poetry: “Poetry widens and deepens human 
experience, not through precept but by example: that is, it does not present something entirely new but provides a 
new way of looking. In this way poetry functions as a didactic mirror” (89).  
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medieval writings describe memory as an active process in which ideas pass through the body to 
be digested: “what we read is transformed into our very selves, a mirror of our own beauty or 
ugliness, for we have, like Ezekiel, eaten the book” (186).20 In the same way, mirror titles 
claimed to “reflect” truth through words, an indication that the Renaissance concept of vision 
included much more than sense perception.21 For the Renaissance humanist, vision had to do 
with the apprehension of truth, which the mind unerringly represents in the form of pictures, 
analogy providing the link between the written word and the sensible image. The point is a 
significant one—signs are of no value beyond their ability to produce corresponding, spiritual, 
images in the mind. The significance of this analogical relation between the sensible and the 
eternal has been succinctly described by Kalas: 
From Scripture to nature, from the human mind to the crystal ball, what all of 
these permutations of divine text share—what makes them all mirrors—is that 
they reflect both sensible reality and eternal truth. These mirrors, like Scripture, 
reflected divine ineffability in the shapes of worldly things that were accessible to 
the temporal and sensory limitations of human understanding. (524) 
To the scholar of Spenser’s time, metaphor performed a mirror-like function. He believed—as 
Aristotle had taught—that through metaphor it is possible to grasp the similarity of things that 
are apart. Thus, even though he believed that the natural world had become separated from the 
spiritual both epistemologically and ontologically as under a veil, the Renaissance scholar 
nevertheless believed that the forms of nature still retained their correspondence, albeit darkly.22  
                                                 
20 The relevance of Carruthers’s study to the Renaissance mirror title was suggested by Kalas (524). 
21 Akbari describes the Renaissance conception: “The act of vision is used as a metaphor not only for the faculty of 
judgment, but also for the other powers of the mind, divided during the medieval period into the three faculties of 
imagination, reason, and memory” (4). 
22 John Hendrix writes in Renaissance Theories of Perception, “Images cannot be immediately or directly perceived; 
there must be an intermediary which translates the images in perception, as Plotinus held. The soul, though, ‘easily 
sees the images of bodies shining in it, as if in a mirror.’ The image can only be a reflection or representation of the 
idea, the image in the soul or intellect. The intellect, through the medium of the spirit, corresponds the form of the 
idea with the form of the imprint or impression of the sensible body, and this operation is called the imagination” 
(94). 
31 
 
Correspondingly, Debora Shuger has noted the peculiar fact that Renaissance artists 
almost never painted mirrors that reflect the actual person looking into them. Instead, denying 
the viewer a subjective position, these mirrors typically present an oblique view of an exemplary 
character: often a saint, cultural hero, or symbolic figure—the mirror in Jan David’s Speculum 
propriae vilitatis reflects, in place of the viewer, a death’s head (Shuger 27). Though Shuger 
disappointedly interprets this trend as indicating a lack of interest in psychological reflexivity, 
one could aver the opposite: that the evidence demonstrates an obsession with self-conscious 
reflexivity, but a reflexivity modeled on different epistemological assumptions than those of 
modern psychology.23  
The conflation of the observer’s literal reflection with the metaphorical figure suggests 
the antithetical approaches to history known as Weltgeschichte and Heilsgeschichte. The first is 
concerned wholly with literal events and proximate causes, the second with revealing the 
redemptive activity of God within human history.24 Sense perception alone creates a spectral 
relation to reality—the image ceases to exist for the subject the moment it is no longer present to 
the eye; it becomes a phantasm of memory. For this reason, sense alone produces a past-oriented 
mode of perception. Spiritual vision, on the other hand, is creative, transforming the objects of 
sense into manifestations of divine providence. Vision encompasses both the physical and 
spiritual—it is future-oriented even as it points toward a vertical plane of meaning outside of 
                                                 
23 At the beginning of her essay, Shuger states that her project began with a hope to discover in Renaissance mirrors 
the birth of subjective consciousness: the very thesis I am arguing against.  The robust character of Renaissance 
epistemology—an epistemology of revelation, rather than empirical observation—precluded the psychological need 
for Cartesian subjectivity. The self-generating reflexivity of the Cartesian cogito would have been incomprehensible 
to Renaissance philosophy. For, as Augustine had pointed out in De Trinitate, the mind cannot explain its own 
judgments: why we desire that which we do not yet know (truth, being, the good, beauty, unity, etc.), without an 
apriori cause outside of itself (VII.ii.5). This a priori cause is related to the universal, abstract entities upon which, 
as I have been laboring to demonstrated, Spenser’s virtues are based. 
24 I borrow the distinction from Northrop Frye, who uses the same in The Great Code to point out the dual 
perspectives of Biblical narrative as recognized by typological hermeneutics. (47-9). 
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time. Through devotion to the latter, Renaissance art suggests a form of reflexivity that is, 
paradoxically, transitive. Shuger’s examples illustrate not a “looking back” of sense perception 
but a visionary way of seeing “beyond” to spiritual form. 25 Rebecca Dark comments: “The 
person depicted looking into the mirror acts as a signifier of literal meaning while the 
metaphorical reflection takes on the significance of myth, or what Roland Barthes might call its 
mythic form. The viewer is immersed simultaneously in both levels of meaning” (6).26 The 
image presents an experience at once personally felt yet universally figural. Herein lies the force 
of the truly typological, speculative figure. Nolan writes, “One’s sense of individuation, of the 
figure occurring uniquely in history, is enhanced rather than diminished, precisely because one 
also, and simultaneously, senses its signifying power” (77).  
Few have noticed the way Spenser consciously foregrounds this distinction in the episode 
of Merlin’s looking glass. Viewed as a painting, Artegall’s appearance is at once utterly foreign 
to Britomart—decidedly Other—and yet her apprehension of it in a mirror suggests a point of 
contact. Staring back at her, Artegall represents a fissure in the viewer’s perception, a parallax 
mingling the temporal and the spiritual—the form of the future and the divine Logos penetrating 
the world of matter. 
The Mirror of Narcissus 
Opposed to the redemptive vision of Merlin’s mirror is the deceptive reflection of 
Narcissus. In Guillaume de Lorris’s Roman de la Rose, the dreamer comes to a fountain. Above 
                                                 
25 Kalas makes a similar observation, writing that “[Shuger] quite rightly observes that the Renaissance mirror was 
more transitive than reflexive (524). I realize that my disagreement with Shuger’s conclusion appears to be a 
semantic one, but it is still a distinction, I believe, worth pointing out. 
26 Grabes says, “The persistence of the metaphor of an image-reflecting mirror from the Middle Ages to the 
seventeenth century can therefore be explain as a sign of a largely continuous world-picture based ontologically on 
the model of the analogy and oriented epistemologically and aesthetically towards imitatio” (113). 
33 
 
it, he reads an inscription stating that this is the fountain in which Narcissus viewed his shadow, 
loved it, and died in excess of desire. In the bottom of the fountain lie two crystal stones in which 
the entire garden can be seen reflected. In them the lover sees a garden of roses, and one rose in 
particular which has not yet begun to bloom. He rises and approaches the rose garden to pluck 
the bud—but is ultimately unable. Because the reflecting surface only reveals what is directly 
before it, the dreamer is gazing into the reflection of his own eyes. The rose he saw was merely 
an aspect of himself. This is Suzanne Akbari’s interpretation of Lorris’s Roman, a poem she 
believes was meant to illustrate the delusional project of the courtly lover. “In Guillaume’s 
Romance, the lover’s desire for the rose was actually a veil concealing his desire for the image 
reflected in the mirror of Narcissus. There, knowledge meant despair, the certainty that the 
lover’s desire could not be fulfilled” (174). The object of love is infinitely deferred because the 
narrator has been pursuing a signifier as an autonomous reality. The enclosures which separate 
him from his desire are self-generated, produced in the fateful look into the false mirror of 
Narcissus. 
The Narcissus metaphor exposes the deceptive perception that emerges from flattering 
desires. To remain entranced by the form of its own desire is to restrict the soul to an orbit of 
centripetal attraction—desires inevitably too weak, or misdirected, to guide the soul to 
perfection. The soul contracts from such a diet, for it cannot grow beyond itself. Jane Gilbert 
explains: 
In medieval philosophical, theological, or moralistic writing, mirrors figure in two 
distinct relations to truth. On the one hand, they offer their gazers access to a truth 
unattainable within normal earthly limitations; on the other, they lead into error, in 
the double sense of sin and falsehood. The former possibility is associated with 
the quickening of the eternal life of the spirit or mind, the latter with spiritual and 
intellectual as well as physical death. Narcissus in such writing exemplifies the 
subject presented with a deceptive but seductive image which flatters his desires 
so as to obstruct perception of the truth, with fatal consequences. (941) 
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The mirror of Narcissus came to represent a distinct variety of perceptual misrecognition leading 
to intellectual and spiritual error. Beginning in the intellect, narcissistic perception promotes the 
lie that the viewer’s private, subjective desires are true reflections of reality. The loss of one’s 
sense of contingency to the outside world results in spiritual corruption, manifest in malformed, 
vicious desires that inevitably overpower and displace the higher faculties, effects Spenser names 
“loose affection” and “lascivious desire” (IV.v.4). The intellectual nature of “loose” desire—
desire that is “unbounded” or “unattached” (OED 1a)—suggests affections run amok, 
uninformed by a principle of order. While the first implies a lack of control, a sin of omission 
rather than malum in se, “lascivious desire” suggests corruption of the nature itself.  Uncultivated 
Eros becomes manifest in the destructive excess of affection, but the corrupted Logos perverts its 
very nature. Illustrated in biblical imagery of water, the life-giving element becomes a symbol of 
judgment unleashed upon the pagan world in Noah’s flood, but in an advanced state of 
corruption, as in Egypt, it turns to blood.  
The movement from Malecasta to Busirane in the narrative of Book III reverses the 
progression of love’s disease from the organ of desire to the organ of thought. Britomart is 
Spenser’s plumb-line, the pattern of virtue exposing the fraudulent image of Narcissus embedded 
within contemporary conventions of romance. The mirror of Narcissus is a prison composed of 
the corrupted energies of mind and body from which none escape without chastity’s intervention. 
Britomart’s chastity reveals that the fragmentation, alienation, and confusion existing within the 
sexual nature are the impositions of a diseased perception rather than signs of illness within the 
nature itself. To understand Spenser’s solution, we need to understand the convention from 
which the disease arose.  
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In The Mirror of Narcissus in the Courtly Love Lyric Frederick Goldin claims that 
medieval poets such as the anonymous French author of the twelfth-century Narcisse “saw in the 
tale of Narcissus a representation of an indispensable human experience, the birth of self-
consciousness through love” (21). Ovid’s cautionary example became a pervasive topos 
throughout courtly lyric. Combining the tradition of speculative Neoplatonist theology with the 
tradition of fin amor, the myth provided a convenient model for medieval poets to dramatize the 
archetypal quest of the beloved, whose beauty was thought to reflect the idealized perfection of 
the lover’s self.27 Goldin describes the origins of courtly love as a convention initially arising out 
of the lover’s awareness of his own unfilled potentialities. In the effort to repair himself, the 
lover projected all of his ideals upon the image of his lady, his guiding star. Goldin writes, “The 
force with which each man strives to become one with that idealized image is the force that 
preserves his identity.” The pursuit of perfection (also the title of Goldin’s book) gave rise to 
schizophrenic dislocation in the lover’s mind, as “this image of his hoped-for self…merged with 
the image of his lady in his mind “(Perspectives 55-56). The problem was not in the lover’s 
intention, but his standard. Like the flattering mirror, the idealized lady existed as a mere 
repository of his own, subjective desires. For this reason, the basic assumption of courtly love 
was intrinsically flawed—if not outright disingenuous. Despite his noble intentions, the lady was 
inevitably reduced to a material object in the lover’s mind, her beauty appropriated for his self-
actualization. His devoted service was conducted under a misapprehension that amounted to a 
denial of its own premises. His identity established in the service of a fiction—an idealized lady 
signifying the liminal form of his unconscious desires.28  
                                                 
27 Augustine: “When the soul endeavours and becomes good, it cannot attain its goal unless it turns to something 
that is not itself. (De Trinitate VIII.III.4) 
28 Compare with Lacan’s definition of the imaginary in “The Mirror Stage,” where Lacan claims that one’s sense of 
reality is grasped purely as images and fantasies of the fulfillment of desire (1112). 
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Spenser portrays courtly love as a cultural analogy to the delusion of Narcissus, because 
courtly love conventionalized the lie that sexual desire in itself leads to transcendent knowledge. 
By emphasizing the personal and subjective over the social good, the idealization of sexual 
desire leads to a demand for the removal of the norms and customs that protect it. The result is 
not mutual love, but total war—a battle for satisfaction in which the lovers are replaced by victor 
and vanquished. Courtly love contained this insidious tendency toward anarchy and narcissism—
a fact attested by the witness of contemporary literature, in which courtly love frequently appears 
in the guise of an antiestablishment ethic and transgressive behavior. In her aptly titled book, 
Courtly Contradictions, Sarah Kay explores these subversive effects, noting the example of 
Chretién de Troyes: “[Chretién’s] Lancelot is the best knight because he loves Guenevere so 
much that he is willing to pretend to be the worst knight, but he is also the worst knight because 
he loves Guenevere when he ought not to” (108). Private interest trumps all other concerns. 
Lewis declared more than half a century ago that courtly love represented an antithesis between 
the social reality of marriage, which “had nothing to do with love” on the one hand, and the 
“tenderness and delicacy” of the new erotic sensibility. Lewis exposes the untenable position of 
making marriage and desire exclusive in his statement that “Any idealization of sexual love, in a 
society where marriage is purely utilitarian, must begin by being an idealization of adultery” (AL 
13). 
We turn now to the “mirror perilous,” the disease of perception where the disorder of 
love begins. In Ovid’s tale the young Narcissus rejects out of hand the suits of all potential 
lovers. His conceit pricks the ire of Nemesis, who in reprisal arranges for him to fall in love with 
his own image reflected in a pool “with silvery-bright water” (Meta. III.407). He cannot obtain 
the object of his desire; he dies in despair. Though Narcissus does not recognize himself at first, 
37 
 
the moment of recognition eventually comes (Ovid does not explain how), and he realizes the 
futility of his desire. The theme of awakening self-consciousness is central to Ovid’s story, but as 
an ironic reversal of the classical dictum “know thyself,” Ovid’s blind seer Tiresias predicts that 
Narcissus will live to an old age, provided he does not “know himself” (Meta. III.405). His 
subsequent death therefore implies that Narcissus appropriates this damning self-knowledge, 
though of what this knowledge consists Ovid does not venture to say.  
His unconscious awakening suggests a violation similar to the sin of Adam and Eve. Like 
the story in Genesis, the tale revolves around the theme of forbidden knowledge and shares 
similar consequences—a “wounding” to his nature and “exile” from the state of innocence.29 In 
place of Original Sin, Narcissus is afflicted by “fires which burn” (ln. 462), a state of exiled 
consciousness rather than physical removal, signified in his lost capacity for contentment. 
Knowing the loss to be irrevocable, he weeps for his prior state: “How gladly would I from 
myself remove! / And at a distance set the thing I love! (ln. 470). This is the agony Adam would 
have experienced had he remained in the garden after The Fall—close enough to pluck from the 
Tree of Life the fruit he can no longer taste. The Fall represents an awakening that is also exile. 
In similar fashion, the reflection of Narcissus causes an awakening of consciousness and 
separation, for the moment he identifies his desire he understands he can never possess it.  
At the moment of recognition, Narcissus gives voice to the essential paradox of his 
misery, saying: “What I want, I have: my abundance makes me poor” (III. 466). Spenser’s 
ongoing interest in this apparent contradiction can be seen in Amoretti 35, where he includes a 
near-translation of the same line from Ovid: 
                                                 
29 Gregerson includes in her essay “Narcissus Interrupted: Specularity and the Subject of the Tudor State” a 
perspicacious quotation from Lacan: “The evolution of desire begins in narcissism: the self dis covered in a 
reflection comes to govern all the multiple cathexes around which subjectivity forms” (10). 
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My hungry eyes through greedy couetize,  
Still to behold the obiect of their paine: 
With no contentment can themselues suffize, 
But hauing pine and hauing not complaine. 
…………………………………………. 
In their amazement lyke Narcissus vaine 
Whose eyes him staru’d: so plenty makes me poore.  
(Amoretti 35 ln. 1-4, 7-8, my emphasis) 
Spenser elaborates and amplifies the conundrum, as Ovid had articulated it, of the incoherence of 
subjective experience. Satisfaction is acquired neither from the objective source (“obiect of their 
paine”) nor in the subjective experience (“no contentment can themselues suffize”). Spenser’s 
solution—found in glimmers throughout his minor poems but developed fully in The Faerie 
Queene—reflects the Neoplatonist notion that physical pleasure is oriented toward the 
intellectual. Narcissus illustrates the reverse. By refusing to leave the garden of Edenic 
unconsciousness—the pleasures of sensuous perception— he chooses chaos, mutability, non-
being. Calvin Edwards concludes: “Death is the only possible end to the quest of Narcissus. Here 
there can be no ‘birth in beauty,’ to use the words of Diotima; here beauty becomes its own 
object and can give birth to nothing except more insatiable desire” (66). Such fixation on 
material beauty, according to Neoplatonist philosophy, begets a never-ending wheel of desire.  
That Narcissus did not know his true self was a central theme among Neoplatonist 
interpretations. Edwards’s reference to the Diotima of Plato’s Symposium is consciously done, 
since Plato’s “ladder of love” (Symposium 210a-211b) supplied the determining hermeneutic of 
the Narcissus myth throughout the Middle Ages, due in large part to the writings of Plotinus. 
Plotinus reinterpreted Ovid’s myth as an analogy of the corrupted soul lured away from divine 
beauty (or reality) by the deceptive beauty of appearances. In other words, he is one who has not 
learned to see beyond the physical: 
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Let him who can, follow and come within, and leave outside the sight of his eyes 
and not turn back to the bodily splendors which he saw before. When he sees the 
beauty in bodies he must not run after them...For if a man runs to the image and 
wants to seize it as if it was the reality (like a beautiful reflection playing on the 
water, which some story somewhere, I think, said riddlingly a man wanted to 
catch and sank down into the stream and disappeared) then this man who clings to 
beautiful bodies and will not let them go, will, like the man in the story, but in 
soul, not in body, sink down into the dark depths where intellect has no delight. 
(Enneads I.6.8, qtd. in Edwards 67) 
Exposing his debt to Plato, Plotinus makes a distinction between the beauty appearing in bodies 
and the reality from whence that beauty comes. For Plotinus, beauty beckons the soul toward the 
contemplation of the source of beauty, the forms inhabiting the mind of God. The one that fails 
to transcend Beauty’s physical appearance dwells within a reciprocal hell of unfulfilled desire 
(Hades), eternally chasing shadows with no hope of real attainment. 
Marsilio Ficino, perhaps the most significant Neoplatonist philosopher of the 
Renaissance, offered yet another Platonic interpretation of Ovid.30 In Ficino’s version, the tale 
becomes a Platonic symbol of the universal quest for beauty. Moving the lover up through the 
three stages of the ladder of love, from sensual enjoyment of the particular object to the 
intellectual contemplation of the Platonic idea, desire leads the seeker beyond the 
epistemological and ontological limitations of the lower realms to the contemplation of the 
source of Beauty in God. The soul’s progression is not only upward, but also inward, into the 
Self: 
                                                 
30 Since the second half of the twentieth century, Spenser’s familiarity with Ficino was a matter “too generally 
agreed-upon to require further comment,” according to Irene Samuel (42), as Sears Jayne would declare that “No 
English author was so much indebted to Ficino as Spenser” (217). This belief endures among Spenserians, albeit 
with qualification (Kaske157). 
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Hence it is that we read in Orpheus of the cruel fate of Narcissus. Hence the 
fateful misfortune of man in general. A certain young man, Narcissus, that is, the 
soul of bold and inexperienced man, does not see his own countenance, he never 
notices his own substance and virtue, but pursues its reflection in the water, and 
tries to embrace it; that is, the soul admires the beauty in the weak body, an image 
in flowing water, which is but the reflection of itself. It deserts its own beauty and 
never catches its shadow, since the soul neglects itself in worshipping the body, 
and is never satisfied by enjoyment of the body. For it does not really seek the 
body itself, but only its own beauty and is seduced by bodily beauty, which is the 
image of its own beauty. In this way Narcissus desires, and since he pays no heed 
to that true beauty while he desires and pursues something else, he cannot satisfy 
his desire. Therefore he is destroyed. 
(Ficino 230) 
For Ficino, the Self is not to be found in images or bodies—for these may change over time—but 
in the mind’s contemplation of itself, what Paul Ricoeur would call ipseity.31 Bodily beauty is 
only a reflection of the soul’s beauty. Summarizing the Ficinian theory of love, Sears Jayne 
explains that, for Ficino, all the physical drives of human love are justified spiritually and at the 
same time idealized intellectually because, 
Love in man is not only a God-given and cosmically necessary and irresistible 
search upwards toward a perfection which is both spiritual and intellectual; it is 
also an irresistible, God-given, and cosmically necessary compulsion downward 
to create the likeness of Divine Beauty in the physical world. (Jayne 226) 
Ficino poses a conflict between the objective experience of what is seen (beauty) and the 
subjective experience of what is felt (desire). Narcissus unconsciously seeks the innermost self of 
his soul, and his error, according to Ficino, is not in what he seeks but in how he seeks it: to 
desire a beautiful body is to desire neither the body itself, nor beauty itself, since the soul does 
not desire the body but beauty reflected in the body. Narcissus therefore pines for a non-reality. 
                                                 
31 Ricoeur’s ipseity is derived from his nonsubstantialist view of personality as a projection rather than an inherent 
quality of persons. His concept describes the mind’s quality of “sameness” that resists changes of time and 
experience, the reason an innocent child can mature into a depraved murderer and yet remain “the same” though 
fundamentality altered.  
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To remain fixed before the mirrored image is not to find, but to lose the self eternally in 
consuming desire for something that does not exist.  
Nolan describes Narcissus as “The boy who (de)reflects all who desire him.” A pretty 
nobody who has refused everybody, he comes upon his image in the pool of his unknowing: “an 
antiplace, a place where nobody lives, a pastoral without pastors” (42). The passage in Ovid 
reads: 
There was a fountain silver-clear and bright, 
which neither shepherds nor the wild she-goats, 
that range the hills, nor any cattle’s mouth 
had touched—its waters were unsullied—birds 
disturbed it not; nor animals, nor boughs 
that fall so often from the trees. (Meta. III.407-12) 
The place itself, like the mirror, has no being of its own. It is a strangely empty place, calling to 
mind the “wastefull emptiness” in Busirane’s house (III.xi.53); it is a location of absence. As 
Narcissus looks upon his image, he finds an unself, “an imagined body which contains no 
substance” (Meta. III.415-17). Falling in love with an “imagined body” invested with being and 
autonomy by his own unconscious desire, he comes to love an “other” that is not other. He 
believes he has finally found someone to mirror his desires— 
All that is lovely in himself he loves, 
and in his witless way he wants himself:— 
he who approves is equally approved; 
he seeks, is sought, he burns and he is burnt. (III.423-6) 
He soon learns it is a trick, an impossibility. Love requires the birth of consciousness the distance 
of the “other” brings into being; self-consciousness is born through conflict.32 One cannot know 
the self through the self. Like Derridean differánce, the image presents only distinction, and 
                                                 
32 Sean Kane writes (not of Narcissus, but of his inverse reflection, Britomart) that the lover experiences her identity 
in the distance from the beloved (133, my emphasis). 
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because the image is his own, there is no distinction to be made. Narcissus dies of knowing who 
he isn’t. 
Our inability to subordinate ourselves to the autonomous unity of the perceived object 
without subconsciously altering it in some way, making the object “about us,” implies an 
inherently narcissistic tendency of perception. The act of perception modifies nature in a way 
similar to art, reconstituting autonomous entities of objective reality into compositions of our 
own design; thus Ovid describes the boy as a sculptor musing upon his statue: 
For so he marvels at himself, and lies 
with countenance unchanged, as if indeed 
a statue carved of Parian marble.  
(III.418-19) 
Ovid’s Narcissus, looking at his reflection as pure mimesis resembles the artist seeking truth in a 
world of his own making. The simile suggests the danger inherent in the artist’s profession. The 
statue and the fixed stare inject the scene with a sense of sterile hypnosis. His reflection does not 
lead to openness and freedom, but to an infinite deferral, as seen in the Roman. One’s ability to 
love diminishes the further one pursues the flattering image, a danger recalling Dante’s Inferno, 
where hell itself exhibits a narrowing of freedom, separation from others, and a hardening of 
heart. Not surprisingly, in Dante’s hell, the doubled mirror is encountered frequently. Akbari 
gives an insightful analysis of Dante’s use of the mirror to portray the true nature of sin as an 
inherently centripetal obsession with self: 
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Virgil likens himself to leaded glass, so immediately does he apprehend Dante’s 
every wish.33 Thus Virgil is a mirror in which Dante’s desire is reflected. The 
metaphor is related to the hypocrites they are about to meet, who are shiny on the 
outside, but dull as lead on the inside.34 For Virgil and Dante, the metaphor shows 
how they correspond to one another: the two are becoming one. Conversely, for 
the hypocrites, the metaphor shows how their identity is split: one becomes two. 
(Akbari 171) 
Dante’s journey dramatizes conversion as transformation into a mirror reflecting the heavenly 
“other” and the erasure of the self.35 Ovid’s Narcissus loses himself in the watery element, the 
primordial symbol of formlessness and void. Like the watery surface, a mirror is able to produce 
a reflection by virtue of the fact that it has no image of its own: it reflects insofar as it is devoid 
of substance. Neoplatonist philosophy held that beauty is not an intrinsic quality of substances, 
but a mirror reflecting the Form of beauty. Traces of this idea appear throughout The Faerie 
Queene, where beauty is almost always described as a mirror-like quality, and the beauty of 
Florimell shines “as cleare as Christall stone” (III.i.15). Therefore Book III does not represent 
Britomart’s marriage to Artegall, but the process in which his image is unfolded within her. Like 
Pygmalion, who made a virtuous wife for himself out of marble—bringing her to life by loving 
her—Britomart “makes” her lover, in a sense, within herself. Her love begins in a mental image 
of ideal beauty, which leads to their material expression through action—actions reflecting the 
character of their ideal cause. And so Spenser would make his ideal queen.  
Proceeding from a desire to possess the beauty belonging ultimately to the Father, the sin 
of Narcissus invites an oedipal interpretation, for it.  In “The Significance of the Phallus,” Lacan 
defines the phallus as a structural function relating lack and possession. It is that which the child 
believes that the father possesses and the mother desires—from which the child concludes that 
                                                 
33 Inferno23.25 
34 Ibid. 65 
35 C.f. John the Baptist, preparing the way for Christ, says “He must increase, but I must decrease” (John 3:3). 
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possession gives the father the power over the mother’s desire (Johnston). For Narcissus, 
perceived lack is converted to horror when he realizes that the object controlling his desire is the 
possession of “nobody.” He has lost his self. Julia Kristeva explains the psychological basis for 
such loss in Tales of Love, where she writes: “The object of love is a metaphor for the subject, its 
metaphorical, unitary feature, the one thing which it requires in order to experience wholeness” 
(30). Because there is no substance to the object Narcissus loves, one would conclude from 
Kristeva’s analysis that there is no basis for self-identification. By wanting what is not, Narcissus 
abstracts beauty from its meaningful context; he desires desire.  
Lacan defines desire as a relation between need and demand—specifically, as that which 
remains after need is subtracted from demand. According to this definition, the utterance “My 
abundance makes me poor,” indicates an absence of need. Narcissus experiences desire without 
limit, and identifies himself with it. By rejecting his identity of possession (his “abundance”), 
Narcissus relegates himself to the indeterminate state of the copula, an eternal state of want 
Kristeva calls “the emptiness of transference” (42). There is no antecedent for such a state of 
non-being. Narcissus thus becomes, in Lacanian terms, alienated from his natural needs, 
“derailed onto the tracks of non-natural desires…doomed never to reach enjoyable destinations” 
(Johnston). 
The correlation between Narcissus and the twelfth-century troubadour lies in mistaking 
one’s projected desires for an image of reality. In an essay on Spenser and Tudor subjectivity 
Linda Gregerson describes Lacanian desire as an endless hall of narcissistic mirrors: 
The evolution of desire begins in narcissism: the self discovered in a reflection 
comes to govern all the multiple cathexes around which subjectivity forms. Each 
subsequent object of desire will be an approximation of the figure in the glass, 
receiving its aura from memory. (10) 
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The Lacanian revelation that one’s self-conceptions reflect an imaginary correspondence to 
reality perfectly encapsulates the delusion of courtly love. Lacan believed that the inward retreat 
from reality is exacerbated as a child becomes acquainted with the use of symbols. From this 
point the child’s desire becomes, according to Lacan, an endless quest for a lost paradise; they 
“must be channeled like an underground river through the subterranean passageways of the 
symbolic order, which make it possible that things be present in their absence in some way 
through words” (“Mirror Stage” 1112). Likewise, the troubadour became trapped within the 
symbolic means by which he would escape the world of necessity, his poetry. Failing to 
recognize that cause must be greater than the effect, his attempts to experience spiritual reality 
through external fantasy led to the enervation of spiritual vision, a veil of his own making. 
Interestingly, Lacan’s terms “lack” and “possession” offer a conceptual link between 
Spenser’s sources and modern psychology. The antithesis at the heart of Plato’s teleological 
myth of love’s origin in the conflict of penia (lack) and porus (plenty), which Pico translated into 
the diametric, cosmic operations “act” and “potency,” is compressed into the psychologic 
function described in Lacan’s theory of the phallus. The structural tension presents the modern 
equivalent of the oppositional drives I have been referring to throughout this paper as Eros and 
Logos. By foregrounding feminine “lack” that defines the nature of Eros, Lacan’s concept 
provides an explanation for the way a negative quality becomes manifest in positive action. 
Heaven—the realm of abundance, perfection, possession—imposes form, but it does so as 
passive response: 
As the intellectual reaches toward God in its desire, it receives form. For God, 
who is omnipotent, imprints on the Mind, reaching out towards Him, the nature of 
all things which are to be created. (90) 
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Form enters the mutable world through the agency of matter. From its identity of lack, Eros 
strives for possession. Symbolically represented in the sexual nature, feminine “lack” is 
expressed as the female giving her virginity to the lover; masculine “possession” is expressed in 
the male’s taking of the virginity. Hence chastity describes a prohibitive barrier protecting what 
may be “given,” the gift constituting permission carte blanche to impose form. 
The Mirror of Christ 
In Alan de Lille’s De Planctu Natura, Nature denounces dreams and mirrors as false 
images, and yet Nature herself is garmented in an ornate mantle which reflects the glory of God 
as a mirror. The imago dei of Genesis 1:27 haunted the medieval imagination, providing what 
Nolan has called “a foundational link between Creator and creature, a correspondence which 
survived the Fall in the image of nature retaining her identity as a mirror of God, but a mirror 
now cracked.” That crack, Nolan says, “both reveals the imperfection of the human seeker 
looking into the mirror and “suggests tantalizing hints of the perfection of its Maker” (83). For 
those who have learned how to look, the mirror offers apophatic knowledge, what Augustine 
called regio dissimilitudinis. Nature is not God, but is made in the likeness of God. From the 
image of nature, then, man is not completely without knowledge of his lost perfection. The 
cynosure of such images is the image of Christ. The Incarnation was a mirror in which the 
medieval theologian saw reflected both identity and difference, self and other, flesh and spirit. 
Knowledge of Christ led to self-knowledge through the encounter with alterity.  
In Faerie Queene, self-knowledge is acquired the same way, as Britomart’s encounter 
with the “other” in Merlin’s mirror reveals. The episode functions as an intra-textual mirror of 
The Faerie Queene as a whole, mirroring the visionary encounter with the Self that the reader 
experiences in the act of reading. The mirror motif, and the “mirroring” function of symbol 
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provided the poetic means through which Spenser and his contemporaries dramatized the 
momentary conjunction of the ideal and the material. Spenser wrote within a conventional 
framework in which mirrors carried universal connotations. In this genre, Goldin explains, “The 
mirror is the instrument of illusions, barren of every attribute except its ability to reflect.” But 
despite its lack of material significance, its reflection gives to the soul its first captivating 
glimpse of the ideal—”The soul looks into the mirror to see the promise and the task of its 
perfection, and the moment it turns toward its ideal, it must study how to leave the mirror 
behind” (Narcissus 14). Like the reader of poetry, the soul in search of its perfection must create 
within itself the reality encountered externally in tantalizing hints.36  
In contrast to the distorting “glass” of earthly passions, the Florentine Neoplatonists 
taught that inner contemplation leads to the vision of love, which does not generate a deceptive 
image or mere illusion. To the contrary, they believed that purity of love removes the distortion 
to which divine beauty has been subjected through “fleshes frayle infection” (HB 220). Spenser’s 
enthusiasm for this notion is reflected in the “Hymn of Love”: 
Such is the powre of that sweet passion, 
That it all sordid basenesse doth expell 
The refyned mynd doth newly fashion 
Vnto a fairer forme, which now doth dwell 
In his high thought, that would it selfe excell 
Which he beholding still with constant sight, 
Admires the mirrour of so heauenly light.  
(lns.190-95, my emphasis) 
 
The poet explains that the vision of love transforms the “fairer forme” arising from the lover’s 
imagination into a mirror of “heavenly light.” Clearly, this “form” possesses an objective quality 
transcending either the merely subjective or emotional experience. Spenser’s poem demonstrates 
                                                 
36 For this reason Ficino instructed his followers to abandon the deceptive appearances of the senses in favor of 
spiritual contemplation: “Then indeed the soul will see through itself, and it will see that light of the intellect more 
clearly than it now sees the light of the senses through the glass windows of this bodily prison” (qtd. in Reese 88). 
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“soul refashioning” according to the Ficinian concept of Beauty as a cosmically necessary 
compulsion downward to create the likeness of Divine Beauty in the physical world (Jayne 226). 
In this process, the mind “refined” by the heavenly form of love reforms itself (and excels itself) 
through contemplating the mirror of heavenly perfection. 
Ficino’s student Pico della Mirandola believed love was first generated by the image of 
beauty, which, awakened, actively seeks union with the object of beauty. Beginning with God, 
emanating to his creation, and reflected back to its source, Pico taught that beauty is transmitted 
from higher to lower and lower to higher by means of love.37 According to Pico, it “flies onward, 
through the air,” and, penetrating the eyes of the beholder, “pierces his soul, kindles his appetite 
and then leads the wounded soul and the kindled appetite to their healing place. Ascending by 
the same route as it had descended, it returns through Soul, through Angel, and finally back to 
God” (qtd. in Reese 86). Desire is the lowest rung on the ascent to God, yet it is the spur which, 
in Neoplatonic theology, shapes the cosmos, replicating the order of the divine Logos within the 
cosmos, in human political institutions, and in the soul.38 Hendrix explains: 
Prior to the creation of forms the world is chaos, formless and dark. Chaos turns 
to order through the creation of the substance of the mind, the archetypal idea, 
which is its essence. The essence, which is itself formless and dark, is imbued 
with a desire to ‘turn towards God,’ as it is born from God. (90)  
                                                 
37 “The ray of beauty…has the power to be reflected back to what it came from, and it draws the lover with it. But it 
descends first from God, and passes through the Angel and the Soul as if they were made of glass; and from the Soul 
it easily emanates into the body prepared to receive it. Then from that body…it shines out, especially through the 
eyes, the transparent windows of the soul”(De Amore VI.x. trans. Jayne, 126). 
38 Lewis writes in The Discarded Image that “the celestial Hierarchies are revealed to us in order that the 
Ecclesiastical hierarchy on earth may imitate, as nearly as possible, ‘their divine service and office.’“(74). Also, 
Ficino’s student Carlo Musippini believed that beauty is culturally conditioned: “we find the person beautiful in so 
far as they conform, either physically or intellectually, to our idea of beauty as it exists in and is defined by the 
matrix of laws and customs in which we operate, that is, the ornament of the world, the cosmos” (From the fifth 
speech of Marsuppini’s Commentary on the Symposium, qtd. in Hendrix pg. 94).  
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Desire, for the Neoplatonists, supplied both the cause—and the means—by which nature is 
transformed into the image of God.39  
Spenser seems to have had the Neoplatonic conception in mind as he envisioned the 
poetic setting of Britomart’s vision. Calling to mind the allegory of the cave, the episode 
reverberates with Platonic significance. Foregrounding being and semblance, Merlin’s glass 
projects a vision of reality beyond appearances: 
It vertue had, to shew in perfect sight, 
What euer thing was in the world contaynd, 
Betwixt the lowest earth and heauens hight, 
So that it to the looker appertaynd; 
…………………………………… 
For thy it round and hollow shaped was, 
Like to the world it selfe, and seem’d a world of glas. (III.ii.19) 
While the mirror shows Britomart what “pertains” to her, Spenser’s use of the archaic form 
“appertayne” contributes the significance of ontological composition by way of the older 
denotation, “belonging as part to the whole” (OED 1.a). The mirror implants in the viewer the 
cognizance of a deeper relation between the self and the wide world. For Britomart, the vision 
creates the dark impression of a larger, more complete self—formerly hidden within the 
amorphous experience of subjective reality. This mode of vision poses a fissure in the perceptual 
veil separating subject form object. Recalling the Neoplatonist account of Creation, Hendrix 
describes the Renaissance theory of perception as an activity ultimately ascribed to the eternal 
Self—the single perceiver whose thought reflects everything that is: 
                                                 
39 Augustine writes in De Spiritu et Littera that the just man “receives the Holy Spirit, by whom there is formed in 
his mind a delight in, and a love of, that supreme and unchangeable good which is God even now while he is still 
“walking by faith” so that he may conceive “an ardent desire to inhere in his maker, and may burn to enter upon the 
participation in that true light, that it may go well with him from Him to whom he owes his existence.”(qtd. in 
Hanby pg. 203. 
50 
 
The world around the subject desires what the subject desires. The world becomes 
a world when it has received the forms from the mind, that is, when it is 
perceived. Without love, without the subject being present to perceive it, the 
world would just be formless matter, disconnected and haphazard. But love is 
innate in it, and it turns toward order. (90) 
As the mind partially comprehends the form of the Ideas which it desires to possess more 
perfectly (one cannot desire what one does not know), the vision exposes Britomart to something 
she already in part possesses, the form of her desire as it exists beyond the world of appearance 
and sensual gratification.  
Writing in the mode of the previous and still-influential tradition of courtly love, in which 
the lover’s projection of the self onto the image of the beloved was considered a stock 
contrivance (Grabes 184), Spenser inverts the courtly trope by making his lover receive—rather 
than project—the form of desire.40 The mirror imprints upon Britomart’s mind the form of that 
which is to be created. In seeking what “pertains” to her, she seeks a form beyond her own 
understanding. In so doing, Britomart taps into this formative, “visionary ontology,” resulting in 
her metamorphosis into a new creation. The vision bears fruit in the inward, prohibitive virtue of 
chastity and outwardly in the transitive virtue of justice. 
Spenser develops the vertical significance of the chastity legend through consistent 
reference to biblical archetypes. Britomart’s metamorphosis recalls the history of Israel—which 
begins as an insignificant, tribal nation that becomes a military power under the rule of David. 
Writers of the New Testament interpreted Israel’s cyclic history of enslavement and redemption 
as a demonstration of God’s activity of shaping his people into his own image. The Old 
Testament continually returns to the notion that faith—not arms—was the Israel’s source of 
                                                 
40 Cheney has similarly noted the mythic implications of the vision: “Britomart’s idealized experience with Merlin 
and her active use of magic in Faeryland figure a visionary ontology in which the lover’s image of the beloved 
within imagination is seen to have its origin in a divinely ordained spirit, and in which this spiritual image, if 
understood, motivates the will to virtuous action” (Secret Power 20). 
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strength (Leithart 110-111); it made them into an odd people. The Mosaic Law demanded the 
Hebrew nation to be a nation reflecting God’s image (Deuteronomy 14:2).41 Faith, according to 
the writer of Hebrews, exists in contradistinction to subjective experience: “the substance of 
things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen” (14:11).  
Israel’s immaterial source of strength returns us to Britomart’s epistemological dilemma, 
prompting her to declare in exasperation: 
But wicked fortune mine, though mind be good, 
Can haue no end, nor hope of my desire, 
But feed on shadowes, whiles I die for food. (III.ii.44) 
Though contrary to experience, it turns out that Britomart’s strict adherence to the sustenance of 
“shadowes” is her source of strength, for it is the basis of her chastity. Once again, Spenser is 
foregrounding the difference between realistic and unrealistic art. Though speaking out of 
frustration, Britomart unconsciously evokes the efficacy of “false-seeming” images. Because 
Merlin’s mirror displays a shadow, she infers, initially, that it presents a false correspondence to 
reality, since “Nor man it is, nor other liuing wight…But th’only shade and semblant of a knight, 
/ Whose shape or person yet I neuer saw” (III.ii.38). Though from a materialist epistemology, her 
logic is sound, she is, of course, mistaken. Significantly, “shadow” contained definite 
hermeneutic associations for Spenser’s audience, who would have recognized its typological 
significance as “symbol, type, prefiguration, or foreshadowing” (OED 6c). The shadow of 
Artegall in this sense not only prefigures an actual knight—appearing bodily in Book IV—more 
                                                 
41 Without the space to elaborate further, I would point the reader to two important books which develop this point 
significantly. The first is Peter Liethart’s A House for My Name: A Survey of the Old Testament (Moscow, ID: 
Canon, 2000. Print), the second is Northrop Frye’s The Great Code: The Bible and Literature (New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1982. Print).  
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importantly, it signals the existence of a coherent and personal, spiritual Form toward which all 
desire ultimately tends. 
Spenser’s understanding of the human subject is inseparable from his understanding of 
contemporary science. To wit, his understanding of Man was informed (in part) by the medieval 
optical theory of intromission, which taught that visible forms were literally “sent into” the 
observer: creating a fundamentally passive viewer who “received” the image before him.42 
Akbari explains that, once the visible form (called “species”) reached the eye,  
The image is then propagated along the optic nerve to the foremost cellula of the 
brain, where the sensus communis gathers impressions received from each of the 
“outer wits” of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. The imaginative faculty 
receives the sense impression just as soft wax receives a seal; reason judges the 
image; finally, memory stores the image for future reference. (42) 
A parallel can be observed in Britomart’s vision, which essentially “creates” the image of 
Artegall within her—his image becomes imprinted upon Britomart’s imagination, approved by 
reason, and stored in her memory. She carries this image with her, the “secret of her heart” 
(III.ii.34). His form comprises the boundary of an enclosed, inner order such as Angus Fletcher 
describes as templum—”a sacred space created to the exclusion of chaos within which all is 
ordered and theoretically indestructible” (15).43 Britomart labors to bring about a reality of her 
vision that is not merely Platonic—she seeks real presence, in Glauce’s words: “No shadow, but 
a real bodie hath in power” (III.ii.45). We are at the border of mystical territory, evoking the 
paradoxical “immanent transcendence” figured in the Eucharist—but here, time and eternity 
meet, as Lewis has noted, in the realm of mind “where the bifurcation has not yet occurred” (AL 
323).  
                                                 
42 Though by no means the dominant theory in Spenser’s day, the theory nevertheless continued to exert significant 
conceptual influence in the sciences (Akbari 17). 
43 See also William’s Glass pg. 103. 
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Augustine suggests such a marriage of corporeal and mental vision where he prescribes 
the reflective activity of “examining the trinity within” (X.xi.17-18). This is a reflective activity 
in which “The mental gaze must be turned inward, not in a narcissistic act of self-contemplation, 
but in an effort to see beyond the created nature of the self to the transcendent nature of the 
Creator” (Akbari 26). According to Augustine, such vision generates an inner reflection of the 
trinity, the imago dei—not merely as imitation, but as real, immanent, presence. Grabes provides 
an excellent summary of how Augustine’s theory influenced the medieval science of optics: 
It was a matter of distinguishing the image in the sense-organ from the image 
created in the soul, and of setting the latter at a higher premium than the former. It 
had to be demonstrated that the eye was passive, allowing itself to be shaped by a 
physical agency, while the soul formed its image actively; the image arose in the 
eye only for the duration of the act of perception, in contrast to the internal image 
in the soul, which persisted. (83, my emphasis) 
Spenser reifies such “active” perception in the causal implications of Britomart’s vision upon the 
ensuing narrative—sensuous perception gives way to idealized perception she generates within 
herself, and which she brings into being within the world of Faerie Queene. Like Augustine, 
Spenser held that the fallen world, riddled with antitheses and chaos, is redeemed through an act 
of vision in which the soul becomes an active participant in creation by recreating the unity of 
the triune Godhead. Bonaventure, perhaps the greatest medieval representative of Augustinian 
theology (Benson 132), prescribed a similar method of vision for a later generation of Platonists: 
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Since our circumstance is the ladder which leads us into God, and since among 
things there are imprints and images, physical and spiritual things, temporal and 
transtemporal things—and, in this regard, things outside us (extra nos) and inside 
us (intra nos)—we therefore arrive at the point of considering the First Principle, 
which is the most spiritual and which is eternal and superior to us (supra nos).It is 
appropriate that we go beyond the imprint, which is physical and temporal and 
outside us:  this going beyond is to be led into the path of God.  It is appropriate 
that we enter into our mind, which is the transtemporal image of God, spiritual 
and within us:  this entering into our mind is to step into the truth of God.  It is 
appropriate that, by looking at the First Principle, we transcend into the eternal, 
most spiritual and superior to us—and this is to be glad in the knowledge of God 
and to dwell in the truth of His majesty. 
(Opera Omnia I.ii, my emphasis) 
Beginning with images of sense and terminating in transcendent vision, Bonaventure’s mystic 
ascent incorporates Eros (heart) and Logos (mind), at the basis of their union, Psyche (soul). 
Spenser’s legend dramatizes Bonaventure’s journey in the movement of Britomart’s quest, the 
point of which is not the attainment of sexual intimacy (though it is that), but the spiritual 
intimacy it signifies.  
The archetypal space where such a marriage between the eternal and the temporal in 
Spenser’s poem is in the Garden of Adonis. The sexual and spiritual comingle in a closed, 
intimate landscape where Spenser locates the principle of eternal generation, a place where 
All things, as they created were, doe grow,  
And yet remember well the mightie word,  
Which first was spoken by th’Almightie lord,  
That bad them to increase and multiply:  
Ne doe they need with water of the ford,  
Or of the clouds to moysten their roots dry;  
For in themselues eternall moisture they imply.  
(III.vi.34.3-9, my emphasis) 
In Spenser’s garden, the Tree of Life has been replaced by the activity of remembrance. Here, 
eternal life and generation are produced through the relationship which “all things” bear to their 
creator through remembrance, by which they “grow, / And yet remember.” Remembrance is the 
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source of an internal, life-giving fount whereby “in themselues eternall moisture they imply.44 To 
remember is to see and desire and recognize that existence is not self-generated—in the garden, 
so doing leads nature to “increase and multiply” in obedience to the “mighty word” by which all 
things become self-generating,  independent of the external world (“ford” or “cloud”). The 
singular power of anamnesis recalls the function of Merlin’s mirror, which is to remind 
Britomart that she “pertains” to a larger world, the efficient cause of Britomart’s transformation. 
In Faerie Queene, memory relates the soul to a plane of reality beyond sense perception—
enabling one, in Bonaventure’s phrase, “to step into the truth of God,” which is “the trans-
temporal image of God in the mind.”45  
As the veils of the androgynous goddesses Venus (IV.x.40) and Nature (VII.vii.5) 
conceal a sexual mystery, the beauty of the sensible image similarly veils a spiritual mystery. 
Grabes has commented on the persistence of this concept throughout the Renaissance in the 
conception that the beauty reflected in the beloved was a mirroring of the cosmic order as a 
whole (Mutable Glass 122). In penetrating beauty’s veil separating the viewer from the mystery 
beyond, Britomart herself becomes a function of Nature’s veil, its guardian. Her office 
externalized in the Heben spear, her “secret power unseen” (III.i.7), Maurice Evans identifies it 
with the whole force of Nature, “The emblem of the love of God by which the universe was 
created and is maintained” (151).46 Symbolically aligned with the world of matter, she is a figure 
at once invulnerable and unrepresentable; she signifies the eruption of divine potency into the 
material world. Her beauty is inscrutable to the uninitiated, as Kane has it, because “Whatever 
form formulates is form: matter remains illusive, mysterious, because it is itself mystery” (Kane 
                                                 
44 Conceptually equivalent to “living water” in the Gospels. C.f. John 7:37-39. 
45 Recall that Memory is the innermost cell of the Castle Alma. 
46 “We all agree that temperance is a control of pleasures and desires, while no pleasure is stronger than Love: if 
they are the weaker, they must be under Love’s control, and he is their controller” (Symposium 197c).  
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127).47 With the image of Artegall (Justice) within her, she outwardly wears a mask of terror to 
the world, hiding the beautiful form within. 
Her “feigned armes” (iii.53) and aggressive chastity are expressions of the inviolability of 
this inner space, the site of the interpenetration of the masculine and the feminine described by 
Jung’s alchemical theory of the coniunctio oppositorum. Joseph Campbell briefly mentions the 
archetypal history of such enclosures in The Hero with a Thousand Faces, citing an example 
related by Nicholas of Cusa of a barrier of mystery, “the Wall of God,” which conceals God 
from human sight. This barrier, according to Nicholas, is constituted of the “coincidence of 
opposites,” guarded by “the highest spirit of reason, who bars the way until he has been 
overcome.” These obstacles include “being and not being, life and death, beauty and ugliness, 
which crush the traveler, but between which the hero must pass” (Campbell 73).48 Like nature’s 
mystery, Britomart’s secret power is potent because it is unseen and unknowable, within her 
contradictory appearance: “full of amiable grace, / And manly terrour mixed therewithal” 
(III.i.46).  
The romance of courtly love reveals an obsession with this forbidden knowledge, which, 
at some point during the Middle Ages came to be viewed as the gateway to spiritual 
transcendence through the sexual mystery. We find this concept clearly depicted in the Roman de 
la Rose as an enclosed garden which the hero must penetrate, where he finds the “mirror 
perilous”—the image that will be his death, as it had for Narcissus.49 Medieval poets saw in the 
                                                 
47 Also in Aristotle: “Therefore the ultimate substratum is of itself neither a particular thing nor of a particular 
quantity nor otherwise positively characterized; nor yet negatively” (Metaphysics VII.iii.1029a). 
48 A far older example of the sacred barrier may be found in the familiar story in the book of Genesis which 
describes how the nations in an act of blasphemous hubris, attempt to reach the heavens by constructing a tower and 
in an act of retribution Yahweh “confused their speech” so they could no longer work in concert. The Sumerian 
name of this tower was “Babel,” which means “gate of god” (Genesis 11:1-9). See Edgar Wind pgs. 221-222 for 
more on Nicholas Cusanus ‘s writings on the De visione Dei. 
49 See Akbari pgs. 75-7. 
57 
 
beautiful image a terrifying mystery as that between the visible sign of the created order and its 
latent, spiritual meaning, an affective regard synonymous with mythic tradition, which viewed 
the female is seen as the embodiment of this forbidden knowledge: 
Woman, in the picture language of mythology, represents the totality of what can 
be known.  The hero is the one who comes to know. As he progresses through the 
slow initiation which is life, the form of the goddess undergoes for him a series of 
transfigurations: she can never be greater than himself, though she can always 
promise him more than he is yet capable of comprehending. (Campbell 97) 
Britomart’s beauty presents such a superabundance of meaning to Artegall when he sees her 
unmasked in Book IV. Her image outruns comprehension, “The maker self resembling in her 
feature” (vi.17).  
Her activity is so intimately woven throughout the larger narratives of Books III, IV and 
V that her actions take on an overwhelming sense of necessity, linking her in a significant way to 
the total structure of Spenser’s poem. She leaves a train of reverberating effects wherever she 
goes, effects that determine later developments. By wounding Marinell, for example, she 
precipitates his removal from the “rich strond”—a divisive space—his absence from which is 
causally related to the subsequent marriage of the rivers and his marriage to Florimell (the union 
of Land and Sea). All of which takes place prior to her encounter with Artegall, almost by 
necessity; through her agency the rivers become one, the land and the sea are made one, 
obviously foreshadowing Britomart’s future marriage in which chastity and justice become one. 
By implicating Britomart in the fatal progression of the narrative in this way, Spenser seems to 
suggest that chastity is what makes marriage possible. It stands to reason, then, conceptually 
speaking, that the knight of justice is created through the imposition of Britomart’s beauty upon 
salvage sans finesse through her contact with the world.  
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Britomart’s marriage is dramatically determined by the moment the image of the 
perfected knight has already become her “engraft pain” as a result of her vision. While 
emphasizing her fertility, “engraft” also implies the implanting of virtues, dispositions, 
sentiments in the mind (OED 2.a). The vision is a type of parthenogenesis by which she has been 
implanted with an allegorical seed.50 Recalling the theory of intromission, which taught that 
vision occurs when the eye receives the forms which radiate from objects, Renaissance 
perception drew an implicit connection between vision and conception. Lucretius made this 
relation explicit in his De rerum natura, where he wrote that “The impact of forms upon the 
body causes it to yearn to project forms from within itself, that is, to emit seed” (cited in 
Akbari17). According to Aristotelian biology, the passive matter of the female was required in 
order for conception to take place. By evoking the notion of fertility related to the seed as “the 
Word of God” in Luke 8:11, Spenser’s mirror speaks to the implicit fecundity of allegorical 
vision, which contains an inner meaning that can only be reached by removing the outer shell.  
As she comes to reflect the form that is within her, the unrepresentable “Other,” 
Britomart’s beauty can only be described in terms of light:  “Such was the beautie and the 
shining ray, / With which faire Britomart gaue light vnto the day” (III.i.43). She takes upon 
herself the infinite distance of the apparent lack between creation and the Creator, reformulating 
“lack” into “love” through her chastity, the virtue constitutive of all unity (AL 339). Rather than 
seeking to “possess” the beautiful image, she becomes identified with it. Lacan adamantly 
claimed that the discovery of the self as “other” in the mirror leads to a separation between the 
                                                 
50 The recurrent association between Britomart and “tree imagery” is explained in Merlin’s pronouncement in canto 
iii, where he describes her as the mother of “fruitfull Ofspring,” a tree “enrooted deep” (III.iii.22-3). Yet her 
“engrafted pain” implies another conjunction of opposites by recalling Paul’s letter to the gentile Christians in 
Romans chapter 11 where he describes their inclusion in the inheritance of the Jews in similar terms of engraftment.  
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self and the Other in the real world—but this we find this inversely depicted in Britomart’s 
transformation. Lacan writes, 
[The mirror stage]…fashions fantasies which move from an image of a 
dismembered body to a form which we will call an orthopedic index of its own 
totality—and to an armor, finally put on, of an alienating identity, which will 
mark, with its rigid structure, the child’s entire mental development. (Ecrits 97) 
Similarly for Britomart, the image in the mirror can be conceived as an armor that she quite 
literally “puts on.” Its form is not intrinsic to her, but something acquired. Kane notes that, “In 
donning ‘advent’rous knighthoode’ she is giving form to confused and turbulent feelings” (129). 
Artegall is a form she experiences virtually and consequently adopts for protection, disguise, and 
retribution. She subordinates herself to the foreign discipline of war. Yet her identity is not 
diminished through her prosthetic adaption; she experiences, rather, a dilation. She is greater as 
the knight of chastity than previously as an unconscious maiden.  
As a reflection of apocalyptic reality, Britomart represents, through her androgynous 
characteristics, the immanence of the transcendent.51 She carries her lover within her. Similar to 
Christ’s declaration that “the kingdom of God is entos hymon” (Luke 17:20-21), which translates 
ambiguously into “within” or “among you.” Christ was telling his disciples enigmatically that the 
realization of all their desires had already come, as if to say: “The kingdom is within you, or 
among you, but it is not here. His point was that the kingdom is not to be understood as a thing 
to be “possessed,” because God reveals himself through selfless giving—his loving, unifying 
identity reflected throughout the thoughts, words, and actions shared among his people. 
Britomart cannot “possess” Artegall until she has learned to submit to the form of justice he 
                                                 
51 See fletcher 38 
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represents.52 As Leone Ebreo has written, “In God the lover, the beloved, and their love are all 
one and the same” (cited by Lewis, Images 42). The prophetic vision achieves an identifying 
effect: Artegall is Britomart, or, at least, within her, unfolded in her actions throughout the 
remaining books of which she is a part.  
 
                                                 
52 Plato expressed a similar truth when he portrayed Socrates’ wisdom as a denial of possession of wisdom in order 
that he might observe it. 
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Chapter Three: The Soul’s Journey 
So far I have examined the theoretical framework behind Spenserian perception and gone 
to some length to explain how the nature of one’s desire fundamentally affects the faculty of 
perception. Using the metaphors of Narcissus and Christ, I made the distinction between desire 
that occludes and the kind that reveals. What follows is my attempt to demonstrate how the 
legend of chastity dramatizes the progressive unlayering of perception. Each “unveiling” 
signifies a stage of revelation corresponding to Bonaventure’s mirrors of self, world, and God. 
The triad echoes Pico della Mirandolla’s description of emanation, the eruption of heavenly 
grace into the terrestrial realm as a kind of overflowing (emanantio), producing conversion 
(conversio) whereby the lower beings were drawn back to heaven and rejoined the gods 
(remeatio)” (Wind 37).  
I have adapted Pico’s triad as a conceptual model for the legend of chastity. Celestial 
“overflowing” is the root cause of Britomart’s desire, prompting her movement from 
unconscious state of being. Next, “conversion” becomes evident in Britomart’s resulting self-
consciousness, represented dramatically in the process through which she struggles to bring her 
vision into reality: that is, her quest. Finally, the “reunion” occurs through the re-established 
relation between Britomart’s ego and Self, the revelation of her true identity as a fully-realized 
self. The final section of my paper is therefore divided into these three phases: movement, 
process, and relation, which have as their subject desire, self-consciousness, and identity. The 
contrivance will assist, I hope, in my explication of what (to my knowledge) remains a hitherto 
unexplored facet of Spenser’s allegory—the quest to know oneself truly through the crucible of 
desire.  
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At this point we are concerned with three worlds, three actions. In the first stage, 
Britomart’s desire illustrates the archetypal movement into the world of the self, toward the 
widening (re)formation of individual consciousness. The second comprising the encounters with 
Malecasta and Busirane typifies the process in which the soul comes to know itself through its 
false representations in the world. The third and final stage, her anticipated marriage exposes the 
soul’s true identity through its relation to God. Like Britomart’s marriage, which does not occur 
within the poem, the final stage figures a spiritual union that can only be anticipated. The larger 
significance of this marriage is withheld until Book V, where Britomart receives a second 
vision—much stranger than the first—in her dream vision in Isis temple.  
Into the Self: Movement 
The journey into self-knowledge begins with desire. Opposed to the mirror of Narcissus 
and its false image of wholeness, the true mirror reveals a state of imperfection. The dagger of 
guilt, or inadequacy that accompanies the encounter with perfection establishes the genesis of the 
soul’s “movement” from its unconscious state toward higher levels of consciousness.53 
Beginning with sense perception, her look into the mirror is followed by an internal (cognitive) 
reflection, enabling her to see through the image of desire. Looking beyond the material 
sensation produces an “uncovering” of a spiritual reality, perhaps in reference to the Apostle’s 
statement: “first comes the natural, then the spiritual” (1 Corinthians 15:44). The encounter with 
the perfect form of beauty necessarily exposes the inadequacy of the viewing subject. The 
difficulty lies in the fact that, as a rational being, man’s relation to the world is mediated by the 
                                                 
53 Augustine describes the self as a relational and dynamic entity that is constituted by an outward and inward 
movement, towards the multiplicity of the external world and back to its own original unity and wholeness (Cont. 
Acad. II.i.2). “In the process leading to self knowledge, the soul discovers that it is both substantial and relational--
the self is some kind of substance that entertains relations with the body, the world, and God” (Pabst 102). 
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conscious mind. Perception transforms objective phenomena into subjective experience, which 
the mind is left to interpret according to the form of its desire. The ascent toward self-knowledge 
is therefore predicated upon desire, whether it is oriented toward form existing beyond material 
bodies, or toward the bodies themselves.   
We see this progression clearly in the case of Britomart. Her journey begins with 
perception followed by the very personal experience of sexual desire, which is redirected 
outward, toward a social good, as Merlin declares: “Thy fruitfull Ofspring, shall from thee 
descend” (III.iii.23). Britomart’s reference to Narcissus (III.ii.44) places the episode against the 
context of failing to ascend this interpretive ladder by refusing to move beyond the sign to the 
signified. The interpretive error is made explicit in Augustine’s definition of the sign as 
“something that shows itself to the senses and something other than itself to the mind” (De 
dialectica 86). Because Narcissus denies that there is a difference between sense perception and 
mental perception, he fails to move beyond his sense-image to the higher reality of the mental-
image, or self-conception.54 Narcissism, therefore, presents the soul’s first test. Spenser 
transposes this epistemological dilemma into the essential challenge of chastity. Britomart must 
decide whether to obsess over what she knows—her sexual desire—seeking to possess it, like 
Narcissus; or, seeing through it, go in quest of the reality it represents.  
Initially, Britomart’s gaze into “Venus looking glas” is motivated by simple vanity, the 
implication in the poet’s description that “Her selfe a while therein she vewd in vaine” (III.ii.22). 
Spenser’s description recalls the account in Ovid where Narcissus “looks in wonder, charmed by 
                                                 
54 Such misapprehension characterizes the interpretive failure of idolatry, the worship and fetishization of images, 
which is not restricted to external objects; for, as Augustine had warned: an idol may be an internal mental image 
(phantasm) that perverts spiritual vision through obsessive fixation on material phenomena (On the Trinity 
12.9).According to Augustine, such a sin occurs when the soul ignores the indwelling image of God for an obsession 
with the mental pictures formed from sensory stimuli. Plato warns against the same in the Symposium (see Wind pg. 
219); Huijgen explains Origen’s neoplatonic stratification of being through which terrestrial beings much ascend 
upwards to the knowledge of God (63). 
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himself, no more moving than a sign formed of Parian marble” (Meta. 3.418-19). Both view the 
reflection with aesthetic pleasure. Unlike Narcissus, however, Britomart looks again—with 
purpose—seeking “that mote to her selfe pertaine” (III.ii.22). The second look performs a double 
function. While still addressing the mirror with her physical gaze, she simultaneously projects a 
gaze inward. The poet interrupts the action, mirroring Britomart’s introspection by directing the 
reader’s gaze likewise to her interior, informing the reader that the second look, “auising of the 
vertues rare” (st. 22), is guiltless of material fixation. The gaze generates a spiritual reflection 
because it is a “virtuous” reflection.” It is not her reflection itself which evokes the vision of 
Artegall, but her mental reflection upon her reflection. The first image she sees is her own, but 
the second—likeness revised—is elusive, the image has been altered by cognition. At this 
moment, to be sure, the unconscious pleasure of narcissistic perception has begun to rupture.  
Britomart’s sequence of looking corresponds roughly to the structure of the syllogism. 
An instrument of logic by which two known propositions beget new information in a novel 
conclusion, the syllogism presents a syntactical analog to the sequence through which Spenser’s 
heroine arrives at her vision. She looks (1), looks reflectively (2), and perceives the image of 
Artegall (3). If we translate Britomart’s viewing into a pattern of syllogistic relations, the 
sequence take the form: the unconscious gaze (major premise) and the conscious gaze (minor 
premise)—related by Britomart’s unchanging reflection (middle term)—produces the image of 
Artegall (conclusion). As in logic, the conclusion, a new truth, is implicit in the conjunction of 
the premises; it is not implicit in either one of them alone. Hence the vision, like a syllogism, 
results in an advance in knowledge achieved in the conjunction of premises.  
For Spenser, the path to enlightenment begins with the physical image of beauty, where it 
must not remain. Recalling again the discordia concors, we see here that the Eros of the 
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unconscious gaze has been transformed into Logos by the conscious gaze. To be dominated by 
Eros is to be at the mercy of perception; to be dominated by Logos is to live in a world of 
abstraction divided from the real world. Britomart reconciles the two using her capacity for 
judgment, which, Augustine says, “Involves and exceeds both sense perception and mental 
abstraction by relating individual form to pure form and back to its material instantiation” 
(Pabst103). This relationship reveals once again that for Spenser and his Neoplatonist forbears, 
the soul’s upward movement begins with narcissistic pleasure in the beautiful image.55 
Narcissistic pleasure gives way to the image of its perfected form. Looking into, and then 
through the image, Britomart perceives her self in relation to the world, rather than as the world. 
Set against the example of the courtly lover, who experiences the beautiful image as the 
perfected self, Britomart sees the reflection of her self and experiences an ideal other. Unlike the 
sterile reflection of the first, Britomart’s vision is generative—not only in the sense of her future 
offspring, but also in the transformation it works her character.  
By presenting a tormenting image she cannot possess, “Can haue no end, nor hope of my 
desire” (III.ii.28), the mirror initiates a change in Britomart’s consciousness. Her dissatisfaction 
represents a movement beyond “beauty” as she once knew it; her desires now leap in pursuit of 
their true object, beauty as it truly “is”: Plato’s Good, which appears in human life as the virtue 
of justice. Merlin’s mirror precipitates a peripeteia no less efficacious than Paul’s conversion on 
the Damascus road (Acts 9:3-9). Paul was converted from serving the law to serving the Christ it 
was meant to shadow; so, too, Britomart turns from the subjective experience of beauty to search 
for the thing itself. With Merlin’s guidance, the tormenting image leads to an awareness of her 
                                                 
55 Augustine has written that “Delight in the end, mediated by that end, is the principle of our movement” (Hanby, 
Augustine and Descartes 465). 
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inability as a subjective agent to obtain satisfaction for her desire.56 According to Edward 
Edinger the struggle to bridge this gap is spiritual: “Understood psychologically, the central aim 
of all religious practice is to keep the individual (ego) related to the deity (Self)” (379).57 This is 
not idolatry, but the realization that the ego is a contingent entity, dependent upon countless 
forces beyond itself—such as nature, other humans, and above all, God. In Spenser’s hands, the 
romance epic became an effective way to dramatize epistemology, for his totalizing vision of 
fairyland produced a narrative that works instinctively against narcissism by rendering the 
individual in relation to all the various dimensions of life.  
Spenser’s portrayal of subjective dependency might be clarified by the alchemical theory 
of Carl Jung, specifically, his concept of the coniunctio oppositorum. Jung’s theory posits that 
every male possesses a feminine soul (anima) and every female a male soul (animus) clarifies 
the problem of subjective dependency by representing every subject as a divided self requiring a 
partner: the two sexes form essential, constituent factors of reality.58 According to this 
conception, each male/female union presents the universe in microcosm. Jung clarifies, however, 
that these distinctions are meant to be taken as “conceptual aids” to describe the attraction 
between Eros and Logos. Put simply, “Woman’s consciousness is characterized more by the 
connective quality of Eros than by the discrimination and cognition associated with Logos” (qtd. 
                                                 
56 The fear of unquenchable desire creates what Berger has called a kind of “moral” anti-eroticism. Berger traces this 
tendency throughout several Faerie Queene characters that hold themselves back from true love and from the 
natural demands and limits of life, summarizing: “All of them; all rely too much on themselves, feel too little 
sympathy for others, rigorously lock themselves up within themselves and, like closed elemental systems, resist the 
processes of concord and nature” (Dynamics 15). Lacan denies the existential hypothesis of a self that is always 
present to itself, always self-aware. To the contrary, he believes that the monadic “self” we are aware of is an 
imaginary product of the Mirror stage, or a “misrecognition” (“Mirror Stage” 1127). 
57 C.f. In Answer to Job Jung treats Job’s conflict with God as a comprehensive encounter with the Self, which 
encompasses Job’s fall, estrangement, and encounter with the complete Self who is God. 
58 C.S. Lewis expresses the same belief in Perelandra: “Sex is, in fact, merely the adaptation to organic life of a 
fundamental polarity which divides all created beings. Female sex is simply one of the things that have feminine 
gender, there are many others, and Masculine and Feminine meet us on planes of reality where male and female 
would be simply meaningless” (218). 
67 
 
in Lockerd 29). Thus the individuals of each gender are galvanized by an attraction to their 
complementary other half: 
For a man, a woman is best fitted to be the real bearer of his soul-image, because 
of the feminine quality of his soul; for a woman, it will be a man. Whenever an 
impassioned, almost magical, relationship exists between the sexes, it is 
invariably a question of a projected soul-image. (qtd. in Lockerd 30) 
Such mutual dependence is clearly of interest for Spenser. Britomart’s vulnerability to the 
feminine power of Eros has already been discussed, and the glaring poverty of Artegall’s 
masculine Logos throughout Book V very nearly undercuts his role as the knight of justice. 
Britomart’s quest for Artegall therefore leads to her becoming less “buxome” to Eros, and union 
with Britomart tempers Artegall’s iron-like judgment with feminine compassion.  
Jung’s concept reveals something I believe Spenser had intended all along: chastity and 
justice are Eros and Logos “reformed.” Lockerd’s suggestion that Britomart’s quest represents 
the quest for the “inner self” parallels Edinger’s individuation “quest” wherein the ego seeks 
union with the self. Lockerd says, 
When Britomart looks into Merlin’s magic glass and thinks of something “that 
mote to herself pertaine” (3.2.22), she thinks of her future husband and the glass 
shows her Artegall. He pertains to herself not only in the sense of “having 
something to do with” her but in the sense of belonging to her self, being a 
reflection of part of herself. For the image in the glass is not only her future 
husband but her own animus reflected by the magic mirror. (Lockerd 24) 
In Lockerd’s view, Britomart’s quest illustrates the archetypal journey through the alienating 
world of objective experience in which one encounters the self as the outer projection of one’s 
inner being.  
Psychologically, the acceptance of a lover is an acceptance of death, the transition from a 
state of ego inflation to a state of rivalry, a loss of self ultimately resulting in identification a new 
level of being accomplished through the union of the idealized self in the form of the lover. Jung 
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describes the process of individuation as a journey leading to an encounter with the Self resulting 
in symbolic death, producing a healthy relationship between the ego and the self. Similarly, 
Edinger has stressed the mythic necessity of the fall or exile as events synonymous with the 
decentering of the ego. “The process is necessarily painful,” Edinger says, because “any 
encounter with the self is a defeat for the ego” (37). Applying the Jungian struggle to Book III, 
Harry Berger writes: 
Psychologically, eros is always felt at first as an affliction, a pain-giving force 
which disturbs equilibrium and fills the soul with violent longing or frustration. It 
is this eros which assaults the world and Britomart in the early cantos of Book 
III…it drives the soul of lover or poet out of its childhood—out of its self-
enclosed, self-delighting idyll of innocence. (11) 
The collision between the ego and objective reality produces a dramatic reorientation. The 
individual comes to visualize the subjective ego as part of the self, and constituted by the self, 
but not identified with the self. Through imaginary death one symbolically abandons the infantile 
state of self-satisfaction for higher levels satisfaction in higher levels of consciousness. In her 
Tales of Love Julia Kristeva elaborates the concept of love as symbolic death: 
An Ego is a body to be put to death, or at least to be deferred, for the love of the 
Other and so that Myself can be. Love is a death sentence that causes me to be. 
When death, which is intrinsic to amorous passion, takes place in reality and 
carries away the body of one of the lovers, it is at its most unbearable; the 
surviving lover then realizes the abyss that separates the imaginary death that he 
experienced in his passion from the relentless reality from which love had forever 
set him apart. (36) 
Recalling that Merlin’s mirror had originally been given to King Ryence for the protection of his 
kingdom (III.ii.18), the mirror serves a similar purpose by exposing such a threat to Britomart’s 
“kingdom”—the embodied knowledge defined by her chastity. As the knight destined to 
penetrate this barrier and take possession, Artegall represents the bringer of order whose 
opposition works her perfection. On the psychological level, he comes to liberate her from 
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unconsciousness. His threat includes the dismantling of the enclosures protecting the partially 
formed, contingent self from its painful growth into the state of its perfection. The resulting, 
creative re-formation of the self can be viewed either as an expression of the Jungian coniunctio 
or the spiritual ascent of Neoplatonism.  From the Jungian perspective, Britomart experiences her 
own image as the image of Artegall—her soul’s counterpart, its anima; from the Neoplatonic, 
the vision implies the transformative power of Beauty as articulated by Spenser in The Fowre 
Hymnes, where the image of beauty leads the soul to union with the divine nature. The 
consequence of this internal revolution—or journey, as Bonaventure called it—is the obliteration 
of the false image of the self, unveiling the true form of human desire. The liberated desire, 
accompanied by liberated perception, leads inevitably to conflict with the false images of the 
mutable world. 
Into the World: Process 
The reformation of Eros and Logos within the individual results in a “new creation”: a 
mirror of divine presence in the fallen world. The conflict between purified desire and the false, 
flattering desires of the world establishes the basis of Bonaventure’s second stage, the soul’s 
journey into the world. As we have seen, Cupid perceived on earth is “false” because his 
appearances are corrupted through matter. In “brutish minds” love “descends from sight into 
touch,” but approaches its true form as it rises beyond matter—the idea sublimated in Spenser’s 
description that, in heroes, love “ascends from sight into the mind.” 59 The legend of chastity 
demonstrates the latter principle in the figure of Britomart, whose love remains in the form of 
“sight” until it is prepared for virtuous expression in marriage. Her appearance throughout Book 
                                                 
59 Similarly, Ficino writes: “Lust, which longs for touch, is one thing, but quite another is love, which rests content 
in beholding, hearing, and contemplating” (qtd. in Reese pg. 93). 
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III dramatizes the conflict arising in human desire between love’s true expression and its 
imitators, false idols of convention.  
Her progression from the familiar, feminine world of the Castle Joyeous to the foreign, 
masculine world of Busirane illustrates the process in which “true love” exposes the false 
imitations as they appear in corrupted passion and intellect. The first impostor, Malecasta, 
represents the corruption of Eros, her operations manifest in the convention of incontinence; the 
second embodies the corruption of Logos through the propagation of a vicious, oppressive 
convention of love which we encounter in the house of Busirane.60 The structure of Book III 
itself reflects the deceptive nature of appearances: the figures of Malecasta and Busirane—false 
images both—frame the book as an outer shell which Britomart (and the reader) must remove, or 
crack, in order to reach the true center, the pattern of unfallen sexuality figured in the Garden of 
Adonis.  
The Castle Joyeous inversely mirrors the internal, ordering power of chastity in the 
external, disordering power of lust, for it represents the convention of institutionalized adultery 
(c.f. AL 13, 340). The castle, a familiar symbol of oppression, stands in this episode for the 
external oppression of an inward power. The poetic intention is clear—this is a land in thrall to 
Eros. The conventional nature of this evil is apparent in the castle’s denizens, “Faire ladies, and 
many a gentle knight” (III.i.31)—practitioners all of courtesy and “courtly play” (i.57). This is a 
socially-constructed world, enclosed, the six knights tell her, “Within this castle wall,” where 
“soueraine beautie” is sole authority (i.26). Though Britomart easily defeats the six champions 
representing the six stages of courtly seduction, in so doing she falls victim to a bait and switch. 
                                                 
60 By dividing the challenge to chastity between these two arch-fiends, Spenser anticipates the modern antithesis 
between Freud’s theory of the sexual drive and Schopenhauer’s “will to power,” yet another manifestation of the 
tension between Logos and Eros. 
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The victory wins Malecasta’s love (i.27), essentially binding Britomart to the law of the castle. 
Prowess is of little use in a society where virtue has been coopted into the service of vice. Taken 
together, her acquiescence to the law of the castle, and the subsequent wound she receives there 
(III.i.65) illustrate the dangerous inclusivity of the depraved social consciousness. Britomart 
learns that one cannot reveal the falsity of a position without somehow becoming involved with 
it. 
Castle Joyeous demonstrates the virtual conflict at the heart of courtly love, what Lewis 
called “the similarity between the real and the pretended and of the archetype to the imitation” 
(AL 326). Spenser confronts his audience with the paradox of true beauty and its often drab 
appearance in the everyday—just as courtly love offered a titillating alternative to “drab” 
marriage.61 Britomart at this point is yet encased in her suit of armor. Her inner passion, like her 
outward appearance, is well-protected. Conversely, Malecasta’s beauty, like the “rich 
purveyance” of the castle, “Exceeding much the state of meane degree” (i.33), is ostentatious in 
its display. It offers exorbitant sparkle, but questionable value. Their contrariety evokes the 
difference Gascoigne emphasized between the mirror of crystal and the steel glass: the first 
displays an attraction that is overt, skin deep, and false, the second is enigmatic, profound, and 
true. Like the steel glass mirror, Britomart distorts her beauty in order to protect it from the 
unworthy gaze.62 Figuring the extremes of feminine lust and masculine chastity, both wear a 
false appearance. Britomart hides her beauty (i.52); Malecasta hides “Her close intent” (i.57). 
Chastity conceals beauty beneath an exterior of danger; lust offers an attractive façade 
concealing a trap (i.54).  
                                                 
61 See Lewis AL pg. 13. 
62 Again, Lewis: Spenser defies expectations that “the vicious loves are going to be warmly painted and the virtuous 
tepidly,” according to Lewis, who says that, for Spenser, “intensity of passion purifies” (AL 330). 
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The poet says that Malecasta’s seduction, her “hidden meaning” (i.50), is “dissembled” 
by innocence. The neologism punningly suggests that “semblance” is reversed and 
“disassembled.” Chastity strips courtly seduction of its lewd significatio. Britomart’s ignorance 
of seduction is mirrored in Malecasta’s ignorance of virtue. Construing Britomart’s courtesy to 
be as false as her own—”That from like inward fire that outward smoke had steemd” (i.55)—
Malecasta speaks a language of self-reflexivity. Forthright communication is transformed into 
the flattering image of Malecasta’s desire. The art of speech in the Castle Joyeous reflects an 
empty exchange of symbols—an inevitability where Eros is made the cipher of social 
intercourse. Appropriated to a predatory game of darts, language here comprises one-sided 
signification. It is no longer a means to establish relations; its purpose is only to neutralize. The 
deception of courtly seduction is clearly illustrated in Paridell’s seduction of Helenore:  
For all that art he learned had of yore. 
Ne was she ignoraunt of that lewd lore, 
But in his eye his meaning wisely red, 
And with the like him answerd euermore: 
She sent at him one firie dart, whose hed 
Empoisned was with priuy lust, and gealous dred. (III.ix.28) 
Helenore’s response balancing “lust” and “jealousy” parodies the divine pairing of Eros and 
Logos. In order to do so, however, she stoops to a sub-lingual method of exchange—”darts” 
rather than words—primitive gestures signifying nothing beyond the universal language of body 
parts, a point Spenser emphasizes by way of florid innuendo to the dart’s “empoisned hed.” 
Malecasta’s court is inversely mirrored in the Garden of Adonis, where “Franckly each paramour 
his leman knows” (vi.41). Against the reality of Britomart’s chastity and the later example of the 
Garden of Adonis, courtly love is exposed for a convention that trucks its meaning in flattering 
lies. When the corrupt heart is promoted to master of custom, reason and logic become apish 
servants to a lower impulse, and these consequences become manifest in the debasement of 
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language. In Castle Joyeous, law and language shallowly revolve around the social good of 
“getting some.” Fittingly, in this place, Britomart “did plaine apparaunce shonne” even as 
Malecasta tells “her grieuaunce” in “plainer wise” (i.52). Here, as in the courts of Gascoigne and 
Spenser, appearances are not to be trusted. 
Malecasta’s professions of love are false, not because she misrepresents them, but 
because, as Spenser states in the “Hymn of Love”: “Such fancies feele no loue, but loose desire” 
(ln.175). Malecasta inversely mirrors Chaucer’s instruction in the Pardoner’s Tale that “God 
sholde have lordeship over reson, and reson over sensualite, and sensualite over the body of 
man” (I.262). Ruled by sensuality and giving “bridle to her wanton will,” Malecasta’s higher 
faculties are corrupted in the service of her appetites. Will, once the seat of Logos, has become 
the source of new lusts, “a coale to kindle fleshly flame” (i.44). Unchecked, Eros has become a 
flood “poured forth in sensuall delight” (i.48), a poison rushing through her veins: “And through 
her bones the false instilled fire / Did spred it selfe, and venime close inspire” (i.56). The 
comingling of flood and fire suggest boundlessness and destruction. Fittingly, Malecasta’s lack 
of restraint is paralleled externally in her court, where “Lydian harmony” provides a fitting 
background of “loose” notes (i.40). The carousing feast itself celebrates excess: “Fruitfull Ceres, 
and Lyæus fat / Pourd out their plenty” and the cups “their banckes did ouerflow” (i.51).  
Repeated images of “flitting” and “feeding” insinuate that Malecasta’s identity has 
become approximated with her loose appetite.63 Her relation to the world is mediated by 
subjective pleasure. She is not attracted to the intrinsic value of objects, but to the pleasure these 
                                                 
63 Ficino describes base love as “a certain passion or lust that rebels against reason; it overwhelms the opinion, 
which is trying to do what is right, and enraptures it instead with the pleasure of shape. Socrates assigns two leaders: 
one is an inborn appetite for pleasure, the other is a sort of legitimate opinion that we gradually acquire through 
learning that directs us toward what is honorable. The aery daemon moves the opinion, the water daemon desire” 
(Phaedrus 2.1.3). 
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produce. Malecasta is Narcissus, filled with “vaine thoughts” (i.41), pursuing desire as an end in 
itself, an exhausting, fruitless labor recalling the contrapasso of lukewarm sinners in the 
vestibule of the Inferno. Of course, desire as “an end in itself” is unintelligible—desire is a 
relation between a subject and an object. Malecasta, however, has identified herself with the 
unintelligible; she represents the sterile, in-between state of the self-relating copula, a signifier of 
meaningless copulation.  
But chaste Britomart is given to fanciful reverie as well. After hearing Redcrosse describe 
Artegall’s “shape” and “chivalrous array,” the poet says that “A thousand thoughts she fashioned 
in her mind” (III.iv.5). Spenser is careful to note, however, that “Her feigning fancie did pourtray 
/ Him such, as fittest she for loue could find” (iv.5; my emphasis). Her standard is not sensuality, 
because she envisions his virtues rather than his physical characteristics. She imagines him 
“Wise, warlike, personable, curteous, and kind” (iv.5).Unlike Malecasta and Narcissus, 
Britomart fashions her lover after an ideal pattern, rather than after the subjective form of her 
desire. Spenser is careful to make his audience aware that Britomart’s love is fundamentally 
different from all the others we encounter in The Faerie Queene. She loves neither the beauty of 
a specific body presented directly to the eyes—the lowest source of love in Pico’s scheme64—nor 
simply “ideal” beauty abstracted from the body.65 She loves the ideal pattern of the virtue as it 
inheres in the particular knight who “Achilles arms did win” (ii.25); she therefore exemplifies 
the purest form of love that may be attained within the mutable world, as Wind writes:  
                                                 
64 Wind, 138-9. 
65 That love which “choseth virtue as its dearest dame” (III.iii.1). 
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Love is desire aroused by beauty. Desire alone, without beauty as its source, 
would not be love but animal passion; while beauty alone, unrelated to passion, 
would be an abstract entity which does not arouse love. Only by the vivifying 
rapture of Amor do the contraries of Pulchritudo and Voluptas become united. 
(46-47) 66 
Britomart’s love exhibits the relation of the ideal, universal-abstract, and down-to-earth passion, 
exposing the fraudulent form of voluptas and the “bace” love it produces. 
The conflict between love and the desire exhibited in the customs of the Castle Joyeous, 
it turns out, is not much of one. Viewed side by side, there is no comparison. The juxtaposition 
furnishes the dramatic process in which social conventions become realigned with spiritual 
reality. Chastity’s superiority to the false conventions of the castle is first exhibited in her 
triumph over Malecasta’s knights. To Britomart they appear to be little more than “shadows” 
(i.35), their insubstantiality a material sign of their “non-being” when contrasted with the 
substantiality of chaste love. Spenser describes her superiority more overtly when her beauty is 
first revealed: 
As when faire Cynthia, in darkesome night, 
Is in a noyous cloud enueloped, 
Where she may find the substaunce thin and light, 
Breakes forth her siluer beames, and her bright hed 
 Discouers to the world discomfited; 
Of the poore traueller, that went astray, 
With thousand blessings she is heried; 
Such was the beautie and the shining ray, 
With which faire Britomart gaue light vnto the day. (i.43) 
Spenser employs another epic simile to emphasize the mythic significance of Britomart’s beauty, 
its efficacy to reveal truth to a “world discomfited.” Her beauty appears as “the image of light 
breaking through an obscuring veil,” an effect Spenser employs in every instance where her 
                                                 
66 Sims has written convincingly that Britomart’s character harmonizes the types of love presented in the faeries 
Belphoebe, Amoret, and Florimel, who are archeypes of celestial, practical, and sensual natures, respectively. 
(Introduction). She is the complete woman. 
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beauty is described, as Roche has noted (Kindly Flame 56).67 Here she appears for the first time 
as a Venus—for until this moment she has performed the role of an avenging Mars—and for the 
first time in The Faerie Queene, we become aware of her desirability as an object of beauty. 
Here, as everywhere else in Spenser’s poem, true beauty is an outward sign of inner virtue, a 
glimpse of divine truth lying hidden beneath nature’s appearances.  
By connecting Britomart’s beauty with enlightenment, the passage illustrates beauty’s 
transcendent, ontological source. Her appearance strikes the observer with the force of spiritual 
revelation. We might recall once more the revelation in Merlin’s mirror—for there, too, we noted 
that the beautiful image functioned as the literal signifier of a spiritual signified. Here we find it 
was the love aroused by that first image of beauty which has made her, in turn, beautiful. The 
Neoplatonic influence can be plainly observed: beauty makes the world beautiful through the 
transforming power of the love it arouses. Britomart’s ontologically substantial inner beauty 
penetrates the meretricious beauty of Castle Joyeous, which “envelopes” the world in external 
darkness, a “noyous cloud.” The comparison emphasizes Spenser’s distinction between socially-
constructed perversion of beauty, and the glory and power of the thing itself.   
From the false desire of physical pleasure arising through the corruption of Eros, we turn 
now to the intellectual perversion of love in the corruption of Logos. As the figure of false desire 
proceeding from love’s corruption in the mind, the character of Busirane represents the final 
challenge to the virtue of chastity (AL 340). If the figure of Malecasta suggests the sublimated 
physical pleasure of amour courtois, Busirane characterizes the perverse, spiritual mastery that 
                                                 
67 C.f. III.ix.20; IV.i.13; IV.vi.19. 
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victory entails. The first weds herself to any object of desire; the second destroys the desired 
object by altering it beyond all recognition into the form of the subject’s desire.68  
In Busirane’s castle, Spenser exposes the insidious poison of courtly love. It proceeds 
from the intellect, as it is allegorically represented in the secret ritual of Cupid’s masque. Here, 
Amoret—the personification of Britomart’s love (AL 344)—appears between Cruelty and 
Despite, her heart “drawn forth” and “fixed with a cruel dart” (III.xii.31). With this image, 
Spenser represents through symbol the reality—the spiritual carnage—of this courtly game 
which destroys love and corrupts society. Kane interprets the figure of Busirane as an allegory of 
the masculine libido attaining sexual mastery through its monopoly on the conventional medium 
of love, poetry— 
As Busirane writes his cipher from Amoret’s blood he gains energy from an 
instinct suppressed, or rather hemmed in, by the conflicting injunctions of courtly 
love: scorn and vulnerability, boldness and caution—the whole parade of do’s and 
dont’s. In rescuing Amoret, therefore, Britomart is rescuing her capacity to love 
from the imaginary codes that have transformed it into a ritual of captivity and 
penetration, and so ends the polarization of sexuality and submissiveness; 
Scudamor and Amoret are finally able to embrace. (134) 
Such are the social consequences of man making love “in his own image.” Human nature is 
suppressed, and love made captive—veiled and obscured behind the very ideals which sought to 
win her. As the face of the “love conquest,” Busirane embodies a principle Roche has called “the 
denial of the unity of the body and the soul in true love” (Chastity 195). The alienating and 
destructive consequences of the corrupted Logos appear throughout Book III in polarized images 
of possession and flight: in Florimell’s panicked terror; Cymodoce’s possessive love of Marinell, 
transforming him into an object she treats “like her thrall” (IV.xi.7); Malbecco’s possessive 
                                                 
68 An obvious contemporary example is the creation of the modern porn industry out of a predominantly male 
demand to see women portrayed as mere sexual objects. A less glaring example would be the unrealistic, Western 
ideal of beauty as seen in the Victoria’s Secret catalog. 
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jealousy and Helenore’s flight; and finally—perhaps illustrating a familiar stereotype of 
Elizabethan court—Paridell, the man who flees from whomever he has just possessed. 
On the border of Busirane’s estate, Britomart encounters Scudamor languishing, tellingly, 
beside a “fountaine sheare” (III.xi.7), imagery associating him with Narcissus—that other 
helpless lover who also viewed himself “in a fountaine shere” (III.ii.44). The scene suggests that 
Amoret’s plight is somehow attributable to Scudamor’s narcissistic love. Indeed, their rocky 
history evokes the narcissism of courtly love. Scudamor acquire’s the “shield of love” in 
characteristic, courtly fashion—a detail suggesting that both his “title” and his “right” to Amoret 
are conventional in nature. Several critics have suggested that the courtly love depictions in the 
tapestries and the highly conventionalized masque indicate that the House of Busirane is meant 
to suggest a prison of a mental nature arising out of Amoret’s neurotic fears which Scudamor has 
unconsciously created.69 Roche identifies Busirane as the abuse of marriage, claiming that “the 
mind of Busirane cannot distinguish between marriage and adulterous love” (195). I would 
modify Roche’s conclusion to say that Busirane represents not simply the abuse of marriage, but 
its negation—for marriage necessarily entails the union of individuals, whereas the House of 
Busirane is a house of war: where we find only victor and vanquished, depicted in the tapestries 
(xi.28-46), the spoils of war (xi.52), and the profane altar to the conquering god (xi.49).  
Scudamor’s adoption of love as a “shield” suggests an uncomfortable parallel to the 
courtly lover, who resorted to a psychologically abusive convention as his means to subjugate. 
The conquest of the Temple of Venus illustrates the hubris and domination of the corrupted will 
that views the love object as a sacrifice to itself. With this interpretation, the inscriptions “Bold” 
and “Not Too Bold” should be read ironically; they expose the discrepancy between the patina of 
                                                 
69 Fowler, Variorum III, 353-359; Kane 100; Roche, Chastity 195. 
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courtesy and the abusive reality. Thus, Busirane figures the masculine counterpart to the 
feminine vampiricism of Malecasta and Acrasia by destroying feminine liberty.70 In this way, 
Scudamor is undone through his misconceived ideal of courtship. His “overbold” assertion of 
passionate mastery is incompatible with what he really wants: a happy marriage (Hieatt 201).  
Busirane’s house contains three chambers that inversely mirror the division of the Castle 
Alma (II.ix), where Spenser represented the ordered soul through a spatial progression from 
fancy, to reason, to memory. In Busirane’s house we find three chambers illustrating a 
progression of realism accompanied by a proportionate increase of perversion. The first room 
contains works of fancy, “tapestries that “by their semblaunt did entreat” (III.xi.29). The middle 
room represents, in realistic fashion “a thousand monstrous forms…as they liuing were” (xi.53). 
The final room contains the live-action drama of Cupid’s masque. Moving from general to 
specific, the three rooms funnel all human expressions of lust—from myth, to history, to 
personal experience—into the central command center of the mind: the will. In place of Alma’s 
three custodians, here there is only one: the monomaniacal Busirane. Cupid, appearing in the 
center of the masque, is his true form:  
Next after her the winged God himselfe 
Came riding on a Lion rauenous, 
Taught to obay the menage of that Elfe, 
That man and beast with powre imperious 
Subdeweth to his kingdome tyrannous. (III.xii.22) 
The blind god astride his ravenous lion inverts the iconography of temperance represented in 
Guyon and his steed. Here, the mismanagement of the passions does not merely result in the 
passions running amok, as it had for Plato (Phaedrus 249d-257b). Nature abhorring a vacuum, 
                                                 
70 “Bold” may imply audacity in a lewd sense (OED 4); A.C. Hamilton also notes a sexual connotation in Spenser’s 
term “yron dore” (Hamilton’s note on F.Q. III.xi.54).  
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the soul without reason becomes beast-like and destructive under the ascendancy of blind Cupid. 
But the Cupid depicted here is not simply “lack”; he represents a fully conscious, positive evil. 
He momentarily removes his blindfold to survey his destruction with relish. As Lewis wrote, this 
Cupid is “blind to all except to the pleasures of cruelty” (Images 22). 
A.C. Hamilton has noted a possible connection between the “brazen pillor” to which 
Amoret is bound and the emblem of the erect phallus (Hamilton’s note to FQ III.xii.30). As I 
have been identifying the male aspect of the discordia with power, it seems natural to interpret 
Busirane’s house as a kind of temple to the phallus, the sexual power principal. Consider the 
dragon lying conquered beneath the golden Cupid: 
Whose hideous tayle his left foot did enfold, 
And with a shaft was shot through either eye, 
That no man forth might draw, ne no man remedye. (III.xi.48) 
Spenser’s image presents the humiliation of one of the preeminent power of nature’s mysteries, 
subjugated to base use. Lewis similarly interprets the archetypal dragon as symbol of libido or 
the phallus (Images 22). Ironically, though, the ancient phallic cult had as its deity the feminine 
power of generation, a chthonic power mythically depicted as a dragon or serpent (Campbell 32). 
One of the first images of corrupt art in Busirane’s house is an arras which reflects how this 
sexual symbol permeates the place: 
Wouen with gold and silke so close and nere, 
That the rich metal lurked priuily, 
As faining to be hid from enuious eye; 
Yet here, and there, and euery where vnwares 
It shewd its selfe, and shone vnwillingly; 
Like to a coloured Snake, whose hidden snares 
Through the greene gras his long bright burnish back declares. (III.xi.28) 
 
Lewis relates the dragon’s role in the house of Busirane to Alciati’s Emblematum liber (1531), 
where it stands as a guardian of treasure, sacred groves and temples as it does in many fables, 
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from the myth of the Golden Fleece to Beowulf. The most poignant example is the blind dragon 
of the Hesperides in Hellenic myth, which is associated with virginity by its location, and even 
more so by the famous apples it guards, for it is “a guardian mutilated in the very organ that 
qualified it for guardianship” (Images 23). So too, in Busirane’s castle the symbol of mystery 
and power of generation and desire has become debased in the service of a corrupted intellect. 
Like Lacan’s symbol signifying the principal relation between demand and possession, 
the proto-typical dragon symbolizes the tyranny of sexual possession. The phallic mysteries of 
Busirane’s castle conceptualize an ideological revolution that had taken place in the symbolism 
of romance: Eros coopted by Logos, had become a weapon of oppression. Though conceptually 
distinct from the biology of sexuality, Logos is inextricably linked to it in the mutable world 
through the mechanism of desire. In the abstract, Logos is the personalized form of transcendent 
reality, which transforms the mutable world into its likeness. In the terrestrial realm, Logos is a 
power of mind which seeks to perpetuate its ideal form. When corrupted, Logos becomes 
transformed into the will to power, generating formless destruction. Like water and fire, Logos 
and Eros are contrary elements essential to human life. When either power is abused—when we 
desire to dwell in it—the result is annihilation: either drowning or burning. Against this kind of 
destructive worship, Britomart demonstrates the harmony and the potency of “ordered love.” The 
process in which the soul comes to know itself through its desires is here expressed in the 
struggle to bring these extremes into balance. 
Into God: Relation 
As stated at the outset, this thesis intends to show how Spenser’s chastity legend 
illustrates the perfection of human nature through the operations of desire. But as we have seen, 
desire itself has become distorted in human nature as a result of Original Sin. Human nature is 
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therefore corrupted through the false perception proceeding from the false images of desire. 
Nevertheless, Spenser offers a tantalizing glimpse of restored perception in his conclusion of the 
legend of chastity in Book V. While human perception is not ultimately redeemed within the 
narrative proper (in a material way), Britomart’s prophetic dream in Isis Temple refigures the 
problem of systemic, diseased, perception in the mutable world by presenting sexual union in the 
context of mythic time—where perception is undivided because unfallen. Imagining herself in 
the role of the goddess Isis, Britomart dreams of the human will identified with the divine—the 
union figured darkly in the splitting of the temple curtain described in the Gospel of Matthew 
(27:51), signifying the final shattering of the narcissistic mirror of the world.  
In her dream, Britomart’s desire becomes sublimated in the polarized virtues of justice 
and equity, a symbolic analogue to the mythic union of Isis and Osiris. While the content of the 
vision is, quite literally, false—Britomart is not a goddess—it expresses a relation between desire 
and virtue that is true, and which Spenser emphasizes throughout the poem as a whole. The 
internalization of Logos and Eros in the sexual allegory of Book III becomes, in the dream in 
Book V, a social allegory representing the universal desire for the harmonization of equity and 
justice. By equating Britomart-Artegall and Isis-Osiris, the vision links revelation, epistemology, 
and soteriology in an enigmatic picture of the resurrected imago dei as a heterogeneous being 
composed of multiplicity and unity, identity and difference—Logos and Eros—a discordia 
reflecting the higher unity of transcendent order. 
In Spenser’s Faerie Queene, the kingdom of God is vision, generated through the 
creative act of desire—desire which, being purified of material fixation (narcissism), has become 
the unified expression of the individual and corporate body. If the vision in Merlin’s mirror had 
exposed Britomart’s “ideal” self, creating a psychological rift between the desiring mind and 
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body, the dream vision in Book V elaborates and restores that relation by figuring the mystic 
marriage of the unitary mind (Logos) to the myriad creation (Eros). As a character poetically 
aligned with her entire class, the English nation, Britomart’s dream reveals unity within the 
discord of human experience. The correspondence exposes Spenser’s debt to the Neoplatonist 
hierarch, Plotinus, who taught that “In all the universe there is but one general harmony though it 
be formed of contraries” (Enneads IV.iv). Spenser’s chastity legend represents this universal 
harmony as an experience encountered—in a partial sense—in the microcosmic union of the 
marriage of male and female.  
Radical though it may seem, Spenser’s conception of marriage is rooted in Pauline 
theology. In his letter to the Ephesian church, the Apostle references the Genesis description of 
marriage of husband and wife as “one flesh,”71 from which he derives eschatological 
significance: 
He that loveth his wife loveth himself. For no man ever yet hated his own flesh; 
but nourisheth and cherisheth it, even as the Lord the church: for we are members 
of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones. For this cause shall a man leave his 
father and mother, and shall be joined unto his wife, and they two shall be one 
flesh. This is a great mystery: but I speak concerning Christ and the church. (Eph. 
5:28b-31, my emphasis) 
In calling marriage “a great mystery” that shadows Christ and the Church,72 Paul’s statement 
hearkens to the Jewish tradition of describing God’s relationship with his people romantic terms. 
This romantic aspect of scripture came to the fore through the influence of Alexandrine 
Neoplatonism, an interpretive tradition largely responsible for the fact that the erotic poetry of 
the Old Testament book of Songs came to be read throughout the Middle-Ages as a metaphor of 
                                                 
71 Genesis 2:24 
72 The word Paul uses for “mystery” comes from the Greek mystērion, which occurs twenty-eight times in the New 
Testament, which scholars agree generally refers to a truth undiscoverable except by revelation that was previously 
hidden. Paul’s reference implicitly alludes to gnostic teaching, but linked to the cross of Christ, where “eternal 
wisdom” becomes “eschatologically fulfilled” (Bromiley 617). 
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God’s love for creation that culminated in the Crucifixion. Consequently, desire came to be 
conceived as the central relational principle between God and creation. Medievalist Ellena 
Lombardi has suggested that, “In Augustine’s work and in that of many medieval Augustinians 
thereafter, desire becomes the fundamental trait-d’union between the Christian soul and God” 
(97).  
Neoplatonism did little more than complicate a theme already present in Hebrew 
Scripture. From the very beginning, Genesis describes the relation between God and his creation 
in terms of amorous division. Creation begins with a striking image of antithesis reflecting the 
notion that the higher “imposes” order upon the lower, 
The earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the deep,  
and the Spirit of God moved upon the waters. (1:2) 
The account suggests that inert matter responds to God’s presence in the way a reflecting surface 
is transformed by an image passing before it. Reformed theologians taught that the divine 
Logos—the preexisting form of the incarnate Christ—formed the universe by exposing unlimited 
matter to the beauty and limitation of divine intention, dividing light from dark, the waters 
(above) from the waters (below), and the land from the firmament (Huijgen 71). According to 
Genesis, in the first three days of creation, God divides; in the final three days, he creates, filling 
each of the three realms with living bodies.73 In a cultivated space called Eden, a land apart, God 
places Man, the only creature bearing the divine image. It is an important, but often ignored fact 
that Man was created male and female, according to the language of Genesis. Just so, the imago 
dei does not exist apart from the community of male and female.74 Accordingly, as the divine 
                                                 
73 On the first day, God divides light from dark; day two he divides waters above and below; day three he divides 
water and land. On the remaining three days, God creates, filling each realm with life: sun, moon, and stars on day 
four; birds and fish on day five; land animals and man on day six (Genesis 1:2-13). See Leithart pp. 44-5. 
74 “In the image of God He created him; male and female He created them” (Genesis 1:27). 
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image contained within two sexes, Adam reflects within himself the tension corresponding to the 
Holy Spirit over the formless waters—the desire uniting Creator and created.75  
The sexes share a mutual dependence, as implied in the material and formal causes 
attributed to Man’s creation. Adam is taken from the womb of nature—”the dust of the earth” 
(2:7)—and Eve is taken from Adam’s side (2:22). Before the Fall, Adam and Eve experienced 
identity as a relation shared between themselves as reflected images of God. Reflecting God’s 
image in two distinct forms, Man was designed to exist as the metonymic signifier of God’s 
transcendent beauty. In imitation of the Holy Spirit’s operations during the first six days of 
creation, Man’s intermediary role is divided between the joint commands to “subdue” and 
“replenish” (1:28). This causal relation becomes reversed as a consequence of their disobedience. 
After The Fall, Adam must work against the uncooperative earth “by the sweat of his brow” 
(3:17-19), and Eve is placed into a subordinate role negatively defined as an orientation against 
the authority of her husband (3:16). Discord has been introduced into Adam’s relationship with 
God, the natural world, and within himself; all of his relations have become corrupted because 
mediated by corrupted perception. In The Faerie Queene, the dragon St. George slays at the 
conclusion of Book I represents the mythic personification of Adam’s curse, the autochthonous 
destructive power arising—not from a generative force of evil—but from Man’s own corrupted 
relations. 
Next to God, Eve was to be Adam’s closest relation. According to the author of Genesis, 
her primary purpose was companionship. Paul clarifies the relation further when he calls her the 
visible reflection of Adam’s own beauty—which is also the Creator’s beauty (1 Corinthians 
                                                 
75 The opposition between the sexes in Genesis becomes problematic the moment the identity of each sex is 
examined in relation to its material cause. That Eve is “from” man suggests that the feminine relates to masculine as 
part to whole. Conversely, the fact that Adam is taken “from” the womb of nature indicates that the masculine is 
derived from the more inclusive, feminine principle of generation. 
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11:7). From both contexts, one may safely conclude that Eve is taken out of Adam in order to 
complete him (the reason given in Genesis 2:18). Milton’s Paradise Lost imagines, I think 
correctly, the inherent danger such narcissistic beauty represents. Milton describes Eve’s first 
encounter with her reflection in a pool (a poignant nod to Narcissus—and probably, Britomart’s 
mirror), when she is suddenly distracted by a voice: 
What there thou seest fair Creature is thy self, 
With thee it came and goes: but follow me, 
And I will bring thee where no shadow staies 
Thy coming, and thy soft imbraces, hee 
Whose image thou art. (468-75) 
Milton’s Eve is arrested by her beautiful image until the voice reminds her that her identity is 
defined in relation to something beyond herself—him whose image she bears. Taking the 
relation a step further, one might say that Eve represents the beautiful, generative element of 
androgynous nature—the beauty of the imago dei abstracted into individual form. As such, Eve’s 
beauty confronts Adam with the test of Narcissus. Interestingly, Eve’s function in Genesis 
parallels the motif of the fountain in the story of Narcissus; both embody the love-engendering 
aspect of the self on account of which the viewer succumbs and falls under the spell of death.  
As the executor of Logos commanded to “subdue,” Adam’s job had been to protect the 
Garden from such error, and his failure leads to the corruption of Nature. Adam’s Fall is reversed 
in the New Testament in the image of the Incarnation. Christ inverts Eve’s role by representing 
the abstracted corruption of Adam’s sin. Christ is thereby made the “scapegoat” whose death 
reverses Adam’s trespass, redeeming the corporate body of Adam (Leviticus 16:8, 2 Cor. 5:21) 
by uniting himself to it. As Adam was seduced by his own image to eat the fruit of the tree of 
knowledge leading to death, Jesus invited his followers to become his “images” by drinking the 
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cup of submission unto death, bringing life. The first brought division (Logos); the second 
resulted in union (Eros).76  
As spirit, Christ is the eternal Logos pictured in Genesis, the Creator by whose power all 
things are held together (Colossians 1:17). As Man, he is the embodiment of Eros, the image of 
creation submitting to the will of the Father, reflecting his likeness.77 Spiritual beauty 
particularized in human experience is Wisdom. Its form is law, the visible representation of 
Logos. The sensible world cannot bear its appearance; it is a fire that divides the righteous from 
the wicked. The inverse is law made universal. Incorporating the discordant elements of creation 
into the personalized form of law, Wisdom is called by a different name, Love. In Biblical 
imagery, transcendent wisdom is masculine, personal and anthropological; love is feminine, 
communal and cosmic (Jewett 26).78 In the New Testament, the two become reconciled in 
Christ’s union with the Church, the head and the body (Ephesians 5:23, Colossians 1:18).  
In The Faerie Queene, chastity and justice share a relation that mirrors the biblical image 
of the head and the body. Justice is a virtue associated with the intellectual nature of Logos; 
chastity is associated with bodily passion, the domain of Eros. While Britomart’s significance as 
the knight of chastity has been explained at length, Artegall’s contribution deserves comment. 
Spenser aligns Artegall with intellect using the detail of Achilles’ arms, “which Artegall did 
win” (III.ii.25) to associate Spenser’s knight with Homer’s crafty hero using a subtle nod to the 
                                                 
76 Christ’s identification with death and absence is reflected in Paul’s description of the Incarnation in Philippians 
2:7 as Christ “emptying” himself; that is, leaving the infinite presence of the Trinity, he descended into a world of 
emptiness and vanity, and united himself to it. 
77  Phil. 2:8-11 
78 The voice of God is rendered masculine, as are the various Old Testament Christophanies  (appearances in angelic 
form). The obvious exception being the voice of Wisdom in Proverbs, which is distinctly feminine. The author’s 
purpose in feminizing eternal wisdom is to illustrate the implicit beauty of wisdom (3:15)—as opposed to the false 
beauty of the harlot (2:16-19). The contrast, while not upsetting the overall, masculine character of Yahweh, 
nevertheless adds a layer of complication. If anything, this paradox merely reinforces Spenser’s androgynous image 
of Nature in Book VII. 
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Metamorphoses. Ovid’s poet explains that, following the Trojan War, Achilles’s arms “went to 
the most fluent, most incisive man” (13.382-83)—a title clearly designating the famous Ulysses, 
as the hero boasts: “In me, the head outweighs the hand; / all of my power lies in intellect” 
(13.372-73). The Homeric archetype invests Spenser’s knight of justice with particular 
significance. Ulysses is a romantic lover enduring many hardships on his journey home; he is 
also the epic warrior who precipitates the fall of Troy by directing the immense power of Greece 
with his counsel. A warrior and a lover, his return to his kingdom of Ithaca is no less significant 
than his return to the marriage bed and Penelope. The association invests Artegall with the 
significance of the Archetypal king, and Britomart with the kingdom. In addition to the sexual 
union of lovers, the dream presents the mythic figuration of the marriage of the head and the 
body, monarch and kingdom—a relation Queen Elizabeth herself evoked in a 1559 speech given 
to Parliament, where she had declared “I am already bound unto an husband, which is the 
kingdom of England” (59). 
Lockerd argues that The Faerie Queene resolves the tension between epic and romance 
by “making love itself a heroic quest” (58). As we have seen, the misdirected convention of 
courtly love exhibited a failed attempt to fuse the two by sublimating the epic conquest into the 
language of romance; the alloy was false, not because the correspondence was untrue but 
because it valorized the dominating principle at the expense of the submissive. For Spenser, 
these forces are interpenetrating and equal, as they are within the tradition of Florentine 
Neoplatonism. Wind summarizes the interplay as it inspired artists of the Renaissance: 
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We find that the roles of Mars and Venus, which would normally be divided 
between man and woman, both recur within man and woman as such. The 
principle of “the whole in the part” entails this rather baffling conclusion: that 
Venus is not only joined to Mars, but that his nature is an essential part of her 
own, and vice versa. True fierceness is thus conceived as potentially amiable, and 
true amiability as potentially fierce. In the perfect lover they coincide because 
he—or she—is the perfect warrior. But whenever their “infolded” perfection is 
“unfolded,” the argument requires two opposing images which, by contrasting the 
martial with the amiable spirit, reveal their transcendent unity. (94) 
As Wind’s conclusion suggests, the Logos drive to subjugate material bodies—women or land—
is inversely related to the Eros drive to propagate form—biological or cultural. Their destructive, 
mutually-cancelling operations can be overcome only through the resolution of complementary 
relation in marriage. This recalls again the passage in Genesis where the androgynous imago dei 
is commanded to “subdue” the surrounding lands and to “replenish” and “multiply” the human 
race. For Spenser, the desire for intercourse and the desire for the order of law are ultimately 
reflections of the same, universal desire for the return of the King, the restoration of Eden. 
In Britomart’s dream, the private, sexual conflict of Malecasta and Busirane is 
transmuted from the individual body to the civic. The tension between Eros and Logos within the 
individual is expanded to include all individuals, expressed in the social tension between law and 
equity. According to Spenser’s sources, Plutarch and Diodorus, Osiris and Isis represented the 
male and female generative powers, earth and water, moon and sun, Demeter and Bacchus, as 
well as patrons of death, fertility, justice, and monarchy (“Isis, Osiris”). William Nelson claims 
that in the Temple of Isis Spenser resolves the tension between “sword and scepter, rigor and 
clemency” (126). Depicted in a statue of silver, the idol of Isis sets her foot upon the crocodile, 
restraining it, as a temple priest explains: 
For that same Crocodile Osyris is,  
That vnder Isis feete doth sleepe for euer:  
To shew that clemence oft in things amis,  
Restraines those sterne behests, and cruell doomes of his. (V.vii.22) 
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The crocodile-Osiris, represents the violence of imposed rule expressed in the destructive force 
of law. Coercive power is a necessity precipitated by The Fall, prior to which “All loued vertue, 
no man was affrayd / Of force” (V.Pr.ix). The poet elides the historic examples of Bacchus, 
Hercules, and Artegall—figures each of “strong hand” regulation and “The club of Justice dread” 
(V.i.1-3). Such reforming power is present in the individual farmer subduing the uncultivated 
earth as well as the king conquering foreign nations. Regulating power of this kind is the Logos 
at work in human life—the energy that transforms the amorphous natural environment into the 
pastoral, cultivated, civilized world of human shape and meaning.79  
With these examples, Spenser acknowledges that regulating force is necessary, but a 
power which must be controlled. Its visage is manifest in all exertions of power, whether implicit 
or explicit—”Both forged guile / And open force” (V.vii.7). The oldest symbol of raw, 
threatening power in Hebrew scripture is the Leviathan of Job, a monster of terrible proportion 
and strength. This beast becomes metaphorically aligned in later Hebrew writings to the nation 
of Egypt, a foreign military power and Israel’s paradigmatic oppressor. Northrop Frye explicates 
the political significance of the Leviathan in his study of the Bible and literature. He describes 
the Leviathan as an archetypal symbol of opposition, cosmic, as well as personal: 
What is true of Israel in Egypt is typologically true of the human situation 
generally. All of us are born, and live our natural lives, within the leviathan’s 
belly. In the political aspect of the leviathan, we live in subjection to secular 
powers that may become at any time actively hostile to everything except their 
own aggressiveness, the leviathan being “king over all the children of pride.” 80 
(Great Code 190) 
                                                 
79 “In the Old Testament, the Hebrew word for ‘subdue’ is the same word used to describe victory in war, as when 
David “subdues his enemies. It can also mean ‘subduing’ someone to slavery” (Leithart 51). 
80 Frye cites Job 41:34 
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Note the thematic parallel: in Old Testament imagery, Leviathan symbolizes the individual 
manifestation of power that becomes identified later with the corporate power of the nation of 
Egypt. In the New Testament, God’s love is pictured in the individual image of Christ and later 
corporately, in the image of the Church, his body.  
In The Faerie Queene, the opposition of Isis and the crocodile-Osiris, alludes to the 
biblical antithesis of human life and the Leviathan—a struggle which begins in the book of 
Genesis, in prophecy of the war between the descendent of Eve and the Serpent.81 Throughout 
the Old Testament, serpent iconography symbolizes the works of the flesh resulting in judgment 
and death. Eve represent the type which anticipates the ultimate triumph (temporal and spiritual) 
of love and life figured in the deliverance of Christ. Similarly, Spenser’s goddess, with her foot 
upon the crocodile’s head, recalls images of ancient kings posed victoriously over the conquered 
foe, symbolizing total conquest. The victory of Isis over Osiris mirrors the prophecy of Genesis. 
Like the biblical idea of death swallowed by victory (1 Corinthians 15:54), the goddess’s 
dominance over the crocodile figures the triumph of love and life over judgment and death, 
generation over destruction, Logos subdued by the behests of Eros. 
In her dream, Britomart envisions herself transformed into Isis, her foot similarly resting 
upon the crocodile. A hideous tempest suddenly erupts, stroking the holy fire into a conflagration 
threatening to consume the temple itself—when the crocodile, suddenly awaking, devours both 
tempest and flames. Grown proud and swollen in his power, the crocodile turns upon Britomart. 
She defends herself with the scepter of Isis until the beast is subdued, seeking grace at her feet, 
Which she accepting, he so neare her drew, 
That of his game she soone enwombed grew,  
And forth did bring a Lion of great might;  
                                                 
81 God tells Eve: “I will also put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed. He shall 
break thine head, and thou shalt bruise his heel” (Genesis 3:15). 
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That shortly did all other beasts subdew. (V.vii.16) 
The image mirrors the destructive Cupid depicted in the house of Busirane. But here, the cruel, 
blind god standing upon a blinded dragon (III.xi.48) or riding upon a ravenous lion (III.xii.22), 
has been transformed into the serene figure of Britomart peacefully restraining her power. Here 
the composite embodiment of inner, “lawful” love (Chastity) and outward, “loving” law (Equity) 
rules the dragon and gives birth to the lion. Alone, Logos can only divide and destroy—but under 
the authority of Eros, he is able to produce offspring. The dream corresponds to the Neoplatonist 
triad of movement, process, and relation by recounting a pattern of conflict, then intercourse, 
then childbirth. In the linear (or temporal) sequence, sexual intercourse comprises the middle 
term uniting conflict and generation, but categorically,82 the sexual act links two distinct entities 
into “one flesh,” an image evoking both the literal, biological union of male and female as well 
as the symbolic union of Logos and Eros. 
Paradoxically, Britomart’s power is acquired through submission. Recalling the 
Neoplatonist “circle of graces” (giving, accepting, returning), Britomart surrenders her superior 
power the moment she encounters Artegall face to face. Lowering the weapon with which she 
has been defending her maidenly chastity, she speaks to him with mildness and grace. In 
response, Artegall “voluntarily imposes on himself the restraint that she has had to enforce upon 
would-be, but inappropriate lovers” (Sims 75). At which point, Glauce helpfully steps in, 
directing the bashful lovers. Artegall is told that he must cease to be “rebellious unto love,” and 
Britomart that she must relent her “wrathfull will” (IV.vi.35). Both fear losing their power 
(Hamilton’s note, st. 35), but mutual abdication of power is required in order for love to occur. 
Artegall must forgo his ruling power by acknowledging the authority of a higher—and 
                                                 
82 I am referring to non-sequential reasoning, or meaning. 
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Britomart, as the executive of that higher power, must relinquish it to his care. Spenser’s notion 
of love is dynamic, like Aristotle’s definition of virtue as hexis—it is an active quality of having-
and-holding. The lovers exhibit mutual sway and voluntary submission, simultaneously. 
As William Nelson has gracefully stated, “It is just both that man should excel woman in 
strength and that feminine beauty should vanquish the heart of a gentle man” (119). And so with 
Isis: Britomart restrains the “sterne behests” and “cruell doomes of his” (V.vii.22). Outwardly, 
peace reigns when the “inhumane” force of justice is mollified by “humane” equity, as the 
temple priest explains:   
That knight shall all the troublous storms asswage, 
And raging flames, that many foes shall reare, 
To hinder thee from the iust heritage 
Of thy sires Crowne, and from thy countrey deare. (V.vii.23) 
There is an inversion here, as Lewis notes in his little book, Spenser’s Images of Life: 
“Outwardly, justice rules; in secret, equity” (104). Without Isis, Justice is ugly, salvagess sans 
finesse. Artegall embodies raw, destructive force, but without it, Equity lacks the force to press 
her interests. Britomart needs Artegall in order protect her “just heritage”: her “crown” and 
“country dear.” Equity ruling Justice, the moon ruling the sun, presents an inverse mirror which 
affirms the opposite: the moon rules because of what it reflects. So, too, Eros rules by virtue of 
the Logos, the order it signifies.  
Throughout her adventures, Britomart’s appearance has, until this point—by lack of the 
divinely-ordered form of love appropriate to human natures—become polarized into a naturally 
and spiritually beautiful element which attracts and a militantly chaste element that drives off: 
As the one stird vp affections bace, 
So th’other did mens rash desires apall,  
And hold them backe, that would in errour fall. (III.i.46) 
94 
 
 But in the presence of Artegall, Britomart’s chastity is expressed in mild and modest love, which 
simultaneously arouses Artegall’s love and restrains his passions. The poet says “it his ranging 
fancie did refraine, / And looser thoughts to lawfull bounds withdraw” (IV.vi.33).83 Hence a kind 
of harmony, or concord, is established.  Like the imago dei of Genesis, their union represents 
conterminously both cosmic beauty and power: the ability to “divide” and “create.”  
Spenser represents this cosmic paradox individualized in Nature’s androgynous 
appearance in Book VII— 
For that her face did like a Lion shew,  
That eye of wight could not indure to view: 
But others tell that it so beautious was,  
And round about such beames of splendor threw,  
That it the Sunne a thousand times did pass,  
Ne could be seene, but like an image in a glass. (VII.vii.6) 
The poet’s first response is fear, the natural reaction to Nature’s ruling attribute, that power 
which “refrains fancy” and forces “looser thoughts” back to “lawful bounds.” But, surpassing the 
terror, her beauty is such that the poet, in paucity of description, resorts to hyperbole—as he had 
done with Britomart—comparing her beauty to the light of the sun. So potent is Nature’s beauty, 
the poet says, that it may not be experienced directly—but “like an image in a glass.” This is 
because Nature’s beauty is the instantiation of the eternal form Logos—which divides light from 
dark and good from evil—within the body of Eros. Her beauty is the totality of existence. 
Arthur’s complaint in Book III presents this distinction in miniature, dividing human action into 
two kinds: 
For day discovers all dishonest ways, 
And sheweth each thing as it is in deed 
………………………………………. 
The children of day be the blessed seed, 
                                                 
83 For more on Britomart’s restraining effect upon Artegall see Broaddus, pg. 30. 
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Which darkness shall subdue, and heaven win: 
Truth is his daughter. (III.iv.59) 
Expressing a generalized form of the desire particularized in the narrative cycle of the chastity 
legend, the soliloquy sublimates Arthur’s longing for Gloriana into naturalistic terms of day and 
night. What Spenser is really doing in this passage is dramatizing a universal human longing to 
see the fulfillment of the symbolic meaning of which human desire is but a shadow. To imagine 
the marriage of Arthur and Gloriana is to picture a universal state of human flourishing that 
includes the cessation of all knightly quests, the victory of light over darkness and order over 
chaos, and true sexual intimacy—a state in which their exists nothing external to the self to be 
desired because the self has become identified with the Self. 
96 
 
Conclusion 
To make a general observation, when we use the term “body” to designate all individuals 
comprising a particular nation or state, we employ a figurative conception by which we limit the 
unlimited, potential agency of human beings within an artificial construction. What makes this 
possible is the unifying rule of a single, defining character that restrains and gives shape to the 
collective, establishing limiting boundaries by which one “body” or group of people becomes 
distinguished from another. In the political state, this regulating characteristic is represented by 
the executive. The executive “head” rules the “body.” According to Frye, The essential function 
of the head— the king as a cultural symbol—is primarily to represent, for his subjects, the unity 
of their society in an individual form. Frye called this figurative association the “royal” 
metaphor, named thus because it establishes the symbolic basis of kingship: 
The individual member of the royal metaphor, the invisible king, is related to the 
social member, the kingdom he rules, as a bridegroom to a bride. The sexual union 
of man and woman, which is symbolically an identifying of two bodies as one 
flesh, becomes the image for the full metaphorical relationship of God and man. 
(Great Code 154) 
As Britain’s head of state, Queen Elizabeth presented a dual metaphor: she represented both 
Logos, as God’s executive on earth—and Eros, as the embodiment of her people. The two 
functions are united in The Faerie Queene, in Spenser’s metaphor of sexual intimacy. In 
Spenser’s poem, Britomart is England and Artegall is the perfect form of law. When she first 
sees Artegall, the effect upon her character and the ensuing narrative is Spenser’s allegorical 
portrayal of what happens when spiritual truth penetrates the values, traditions, and customs of a 
nation. Spenser’s narrative offers a mirror of desire in which the “natural” gives way to the 
“divine. The final vision prophetically suggests the consummation of all desire—the queen’s 
desire for peace and a woman’s desire for a lover—a heavenly realm on earth.  
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The kingdom appears when the individual has learned to identify its desires with the 
social whole. To break free from the self-deluding mirror of Narcissus is to redirect the flames of 
uncultivated desire from reflexive, autoerotic impotence into a consuming passion for the truly 
“human,” which is to identify oneself with the social whole. Recalling that Britomart’s personal 
experience of sexual desire is transformed, through Merlin’s guidance, into a desire for social 
generation—a “famous progeny” (III.iii.22) destined to lead England against its foes “Till 
vniuersall peace compound all civil iarre” (iii.23), Kane argues, appropriately, that Spenser’s 
Britomart “substitutes a romantic obsession for heroic obligation: an image of a lover for one of 
the city” (129). Her journey illustrates that the dilation of consciousness—beginning in 
unconscious perception (sexual desire) and culminating in spiritual perception—exhibits a 
corresponding widening of human relations. Britomart’s mastery of her sexuality expressed in 
the virtue of chastity becomes perfected in Artegall’s mastery of political rule. Judith Anderson 
writes: 
In discovering the relation between Artegall’s quest in an external world and his 
honor, she also becomes conscious of a relation between an impersonal and a 
personal world. Thus Britomart deals “true Iustice”; she reforms Radegone, 
moderates her own smart, and tempers her passion. In short she embodies the 
inner mean, and she becomes truly like Isis. Yet even in these stanzas, we do not 
find an all-inclusive Eden, only the world of inner order to which Britomart 
belongs. (461) 
The instantiation of universal order revealed within Britomart’s internal order reveals Spenser’s 
interest in the Renaissance obsession with the analogy of Man as microcosm of the universe, in 
Raleigh’s phrase,  “the bond and chain which tieth together” both divine and mortal natures 
(History of the World I.v.58). The chastity legend reveals the indeterminacy of human desire as a 
means of acquiring self-knowledge at the same time that it valorizes desire’s intermediate 
function as a mirror revealing universal, abstract truth. 
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